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THE CASE FOR MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
IN SECURITIES REGULATION
AROUND THE WORLD
Allen Ferrell*
I. INTRODUCTION
The desirability of mandatory disclosure requirements in securities
regulation has long been a subject of debate among legal academics and
economists. A number of prominent commentators have argued that
mandatory disclosure requirements are unnecessary, and even harmful, as
market forces will generally ensure that firms disclose the optimal level of
information.1 For instance, Roberta Romano has argued for the removal of
mandatory disclosure requirements in a series of important articles.2
Proponents of mandatory disclosure have countered by arguing that the
information released by firms generates important informational
externalities.3 One such informational externality that has received
significant attention is the possibility that firm disclosures may improve the
stock price accuracy of firms other than the disclosing firm.4 Given that
* Greenfield Professor of Securities Law, Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Lucian
Bebchuk, Mark Roe and participants in the Harvard Law School Law and Finance seminar for
helpful comments and conversations and the Harvard Law School John M. Olin Foundation in
Law, Economics and Business and the Harvard Milton Fund for financial support.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate,
Financial & Commercial Law Symposium: Securities Market Structure and Regulation—What
Does the Future Hold? (Nov. 10, 2006). Other articles presented at that symposium were
published in Volume 1, Number 2 of the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial
Law.
1. For scholars critical of mandatory disclosure, see HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979); George J. Benston,
Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998); George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the
Securities Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117 (1964); cf. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable
Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903
(1998); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation:
A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 (1994).
2. See Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 1 (proposing that firms select which
state’s regulatory regime will set their disclosure requirements); Roberta Romano, The Need for
Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 387 (2001)
[hereinafter Romano, The Need for Competition] (defending the proposal against various
criticisms).
3. See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not
Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1345–46 (1999) [hereinafter Fox, Retaining
Mandatory Securities Disclosure] (arguing that certain firm disclosures will have effects on third
parties, such as suppliers and customers, that will not be internalized by the firm); Merritt B. Fox,
Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV.
2498, 2562–69 (1997) [hereinafter Fox, Who Should Regulate]; cf. Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws
and the Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1034–35 (1992).
4. See Fox, Who Should Regulate, supra note 3, at 2562–69; Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share
Price Accuracy and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331 (2003).
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firms will not consider these externalities when deciding which pieces of
information to disclose, it is argued that a mandatory disclosure regime can
be socially beneficial.
Much of the debate to date has focused primarily on the merits of
mandatory disclosure in the United States, where dispersed ownership
structures are prevalent. This article focuses on whether mandatory
disclosure can play a socially beneficial role in countries with concentrated
ownership structures. Most countries around the world have concentrated
ownership structures, including those of Continental Europe. This article
argues that the case for mandatory disclosure in these countries does not
hinge on whether there are informational externalities associated with firm
disclosures—an issue that has dominated the academic debate over
mandatory disclosure. Rather, the theoretical case for a demanding
mandatory disclosure regime in these countries is based on the view that a
demanding mandatory disclosure regime can reduce the level of diversion
of corporate resources by controlling shareholders, and promote
competition (both for capital and in the product market) against established
firms. This theoretical case is backed by substantial empirical support.5
Neither a reduction in the diversion of corporate resources nor an increase
in competition is likely to be in the interests of existing controlling
shareholders. However, as this article will show, these effects of mandatory
disclosure are very likely to be in the interests of minority shareholders in
countries with a high concentration of controlling shareholders. In countries
such as the United States, which have dispersed ownership structures (but
in many cases entrenched managers who may not always act in shareholder
interest)6 mandatory disclosure can serve the interests of shareholders as a
group as well.
Examining the desirability of mandatory disclosure requirements is
crucial given the important role these requirements play in modern
securities regulation. A number of countries have adopted and/or
strengthened mandatory disclosure requirements for their publicly traded
firms in the last decade,7 and many more countries, including developing
ones, are considering doing the same.8 Indeed, the quality of disclosure
For a useful model capturing the effects of informational externalities associated with firm
disclosures, see Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure
Regulation and Externalities, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 479 (2000).
5. See infra section III.B.
6. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
7. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, in
CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 33, 52–53 (Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Mark J. Roe eds., 2004).
8. See, e.g., JUZHONG ZHUANG ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCE IN EAST
ASIA (2000); Eur. Comm’n, Internal Market Directorate General, Towards an EU Regime on
Transparency Obligations of Issuers whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated
Market, Consultation Document of the Services of the Internal Market Directorate General (2001)
(proposing EU-wide disclosure requirements).
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regulation was a particular focus in the aftermath of the East Asian financial
crisis of 1997–1998, which many have blamed, at least in part, on poor firm
transparency in the region.9
But is mandatory disclosure really necessary? The traditional case,
which suggests it is not because market forces alone will compel firms to
disclose, is outlined in Part II of this article. The theoretical case for
mandatory disclosure, this article will argue, begins with the observation
that the level of diversion of corporate resources by controlling shareholders
is, on average, substantial in countries with concentrated ownership
structures. These private benefits of control can theoretically be reduced to
some extent by the adoption of a mandatory disclosure regime. The
empirical literature that documents the size of controlling shareholders’
private benefits of control is discussed in Part III.A. Part III.B. predicts that
controlling shareholders’ private benefits of control can be reduced by a
country’s adoption of a mandatory disclosure regime. If this prediction is
true, then existing controlling shareholders will tend to have a preference
for a lax disclosure regime. The empirical literature that is relevant to
determine whether there is a linkage between disclosure regulation and the
level of private benefits of control is also discussed in detail in Part III.B.
This literature, it is argued, supports the view that mandatory disclosure
sometimes substantially reduces controlling shareholders’ private benefits
of control.
However, neither the existence of substantial private benefits of control
nor the potential for reduction of these benefits through the adoption of a
mandatory disclosure regime is sufficient to establish the desirability of
mandatory disclosure in countries with concentrated ownership structures.
For example, it is possible that private benefits of control merely represent a
transfer of value from minority shareholders to controlling shareholders,
with no net social losses. The effect of mandatory disclosure on
competition—for capital and in the product market—must be considered
when evaluating whether existing controlling shareholders’ tendency to
prefer a lax disclosure regime will result in social losses. Part III.C.1 argues
that a mandatory disclosure regime can reduce the cost of external finance
to potential competitors of firms owned by existing controlling
shareholders. Part III.C.2 then argues that existing controlling shareholders,
including those shareholders of firms raising external finance for the first
time, may prefer a lax disclosure regime as a means of reducing the ability
9. See, e.g., Simon Johnson et al., Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis, 58 J.
FIN. ECON. 141 (2000) (emphasizing overall poor corporate governance as responsible for East
Asian crisis); Todd Mitton, A Cross-Firm Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance on the
East Asian Financial Crisis, 64 J. FIN. ECON. 215, 216 (2002); Joseph Stiglitz, Address to the
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations: The Role of International Financial Institutions in the
Current
Global
Economy
(Feb.
1998),
available
at
http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/papers.cfm.
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of potential competitors to raise external finance. This socially undesirable
reduction of competition can occur along two dimensions: a reduction in
competition for capital and a reduction in competition in the product
market. Part III.C.2 presents empirical evidence consistent with the
conclusion that the level of competition along both these dimensions would
be positively affected by the presence of a mandatory disclosure regime.10
The fact that some (and perhaps most) controlling shareholders would
prefer a lax disclosure regime as a means to protect their private benefits of
control and reduce competition does not necessarily imply that firms that do
find it in their self-interest to credibly commit to a demanding disclosure
regime cannot do so. Nevertheless, Part IV argues that willing firms will
not necessarily be able to credibly commit. Part IV.A. discusses how a
willing firm might credibly commit to such a regime, but also addresses
how governments and exchanges might very well not adopt a demanding
disclosure regime, even if there is firm demand for one, given the
opposition of those firms that do not find it in their self-interest. Moreover,
as Part IV.B.1 emphasizes, competition between a country’s domestic
exchanges for investors’ order flow will not necessarily result in a “race to
the top” in terms of disclosure requirements imposed by exchanges on listed
firms. Part IV.B.2 then looks at the pre-mandatory disclosure regulation of
exchanges in the United States as a test case to see whether competition
between exchanges will result in a demanding disclosure regime being
offered by at least some exchanges. This section argues that prior to
governmental pressure on exchanges to adopt demanding disclosure
regulation, the level of disclosure imposed on firms by U.S. exchanges,
including the New York Stock Exchange, was quite low. Part IV.C.
discusses why international competition between exchanges for listings is
not a perfect substitute for a country’s home exchange or government
adopting meaningful disclosure regulation. Part IV.D. explains why firms,
through provisions in their corporate charters and other contractual
arrangements, are often unable to credibly commit to a demanding
disclosure regime through unilateral action.
A common argument for mandatory disclosure is that it ensures that the
cheapest cost producer of firm-specific information, the firm itself in many
circumstances, actually produces and discloses this information to the
markets. This has the socially beneficial effect, the argument goes, of
preventing traders from generating the same information but at a higher
cost. Part V argues that this standard argument does not, standing alone,
constitute a reason to favor mandatory disclosure. Rather, the force of this
argument ultimately depends on whether firms are willing and able to

10. See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE
CAPITALISTS (2003) for a general argument that investor protections can encourage product
market competition.

2007]

The Case for Mandatory Disclosure

85

credibly commit to a demanding disclosure regime—the issues addressed in
Parts III and IV.
Finally, Part VI examines empirical studies of the effect of mandatory
disclosure on stock returns, volatility and financial development. In contrast
to the conclusions of scholars opposed to mandatory disclosure, this article
concludes, in Part VII, that the empirical evidence strongly supports the
view that mandatory disclosure often has socially beneficial effects.
II. THE TRADITIONAL CASE AGAINST MANDATORY
DISCLOSURE
The earliest comprehensive evaluations of the effects of a firm’s
disclosure decision, in the work of Sanford Grossman and Olivier Hart,
among others, contained a powerful conclusion: In a world in which a firm
has private information about the quality of its product and disclosure is
costless, firms will voluntarily publicly disclose their private information as
a signal of their products’ quality.11 The reason for this is simple but
significant: Firms will voluntarily disclose information so as not to be
confused by customers with firms with lower quality products. Firms with
high quality products will, therefore, voluntarily commit to a disclosure
regime that credibly commits the firm to full public disclosure. Firms with
product quality a notch below that of these high quality firms will then
voluntarily commit to a full disclosure regime so as not to be confused with
firms with even lower quality. Eventually, the market completely unravels
with all firms voluntarily disclosing their product quality, even if it is
poor.12
This elegant and intuitively appealing signaling story has been the main
theoretical support for the contention that market forces alone will ensure
the optimal level of voluntary disclosure by firms. Most prominently,
Roberta Romano, in her articles advocating the removal of mandatory
disclosure requirements, relies heavily on this signaling story for her
theoretical case against the need for mandated disclosure in securities
regulation.13 Simply put, firms that wish to maximize the value of their

11. See S. J. Grossman & O. D. Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 J. FIN. 323
(1980); see also Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private
Disclosure About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461 (1981) [hereinafter Grossman, The
Informational Role of Warranties]. In the Grossman-Hart model, there are sanctions for lying but
no sanctions for non-disclosure.
12. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties, supra note 11.
13. See, e.g., Romano, The Need for Competition, supra note 2, at 418 (“The signaling
hypothesis regarding information disclosure is a plausible scenario in today’s capital markets. . . .
It is therefore theoretically difficult for advocates of mandated disclosure to maintain their
normative claims.”). Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 683 (1984) (“Once the firm starts disclosing it cannot
stop short of making any critical revelation, because investors always assume the worst. It must
disclose the bad with the good, lest investors assume that the bad is even worse than it is.”).
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shares will disclose to ensure that investors do not mistakenly assign a
positive probability that the firm is withholding information that would
reveal a low firm value and, hence, assign a low value to the firm’s shares.14
The signaling argument as applied to firm disclosure decisions retains
some of its power despite the unrealistic assumption that disclosure is
costless. Disclosure can obviously create a variety of costs for firms,
ranging from the cost of gathering, verifying and releasing information to
the loss of competitive advantage resulting from the release of proprietary
information. While these costs might lead a firm to rationally refrain from
disclosing some information, this simply means that firms will trade off the
costs and benefits of disclosure.15 Who better to make this trade-off, many
argue, than firms who will suffer the consequences of making the wrong
decision? After all, there is no reason to believe that firms will not optimize
their disclosure decisions so that the marginal costs and benefits of
disclosing are equated.
The signaling story, and hence its use as the linchpin for the case
against mandatory disclosure, however, falls short as a basis for policy on
two crucial points. First, the signaling argument relies on the assumption
that those who set firm policy, such as entrenched managers and controlling
shareholders, want to credibly commit to a disclosure regime that will
maximize the market’s current valuation of the firm. For the reasons given
in Part III, this is simply not true for many firms in most countries. This
group of unwilling firms can even include firms selling shares to the public
for the first time. Second, the signaling argument relies on the assumption
that firms can credibly commit to any desired level of disclosure. Again,
this is less likely to be true than one might initially think. Part IV explains
why some firms are unable to credibly commit to a high level of disclosure
even if they might find it in their self-interests to do so.
III. DO FIRMS WANT TO CREDIBLY COMMIT?
Empirical evidence indicates that many controlling shareholders around
the world divert corporate resources to themselves on a substantial scale.
Logic and empirical evidence suggest that controlling shareholders’ ability
to engage in this diversion of corporate resources can be adversely affected
by the imposition of mandatory disclosure requirements. Equally important,
mandatory disclosure requirements can have the effect of increasing
competition for capital and competition in the product market by decreasing
the cost of external finance to new entrants and potential competitors. This
increased competition would be to the detriment of existing firms with

14. See Romano, The Need for Competition, supra note 2, at 544, 562.
15. See, e.g., Robert E. Verrecchia, Discretionary Disclosure, 5 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179 (1983),
for a model in which disclosure is costly.
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controlling shareholders. These different considerations deserve in-depth
examination.
A. CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE DIVERSION
Most firms around the world have controlling shareholders.16 The
dispersed ownership structures of the United States and the United
Kingdom are an exception. For this reason, it is crucial to consider the
preferences of controlling shareholders when thinking about disclosure
decisions for most firms around the world.17
Given the prevalence of concentrated ownership around the world, the
potential conflict between the interests of controlling shareholders and those
of minority shareholders is a significant problem facing corporate and
securities regulators in most countries.18 As is widely recognized,
controlling shareholders will tend to ignore the harm caused to minority
shareholders’ interests when deciding which actions the firm should take.
More to the point, controlling shareholders will have an incentive to divert
corporate assets to themselves at the expense of existing minority
shareholders.
The empirical evidence strongly indicates that diversion of corporate
resources by controlling shareholders is an economically important and
widespread phenomenon. This empirical literature consists of studies that
have attempted to directly measure the private benefits of control accruing
to the controlling shareholder (and not to other shareholders), as well as
studies documenting the widespread existence of so-called “tunneling”—
the phenomenon of corporate assets being transferred from the firm to a
controlling shareholder through a variety of mechanisms.19 “Tunneling”
includes such activities as transferring assets at below-market price from
16. In the United States, in contrast, it is more important to focus on the preferences of
managers of firms with dispersed ownership, who may have some degree of entrenchment against
shareholder wishes, as well as the preferences of the firms’ shareholders. See Rafael La Porta et
al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1146 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Law and
Finance]; Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997)
[hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance]; see also Marco Becht &
Ailsa Röell, Blockholdings in Europe: An International Comparison, 43 EUR. ECON. REV. 1049,
1050 (1999).
17. See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate
Governance? (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 491,
2004), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Bebchuk_et%
20al_491.pdf. for an index measuring managerial entrenchment for U.S. firms. The degree of
managerial entrenchment, as measured by this index, is correlated—with 1% statistical
significance—with firm valuation. Moreover, firm valuation is monotonically decreasing in the
entrenchment index. Id. at 17.
18. See generally REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2004) (discussing the main issues in corporate and
securities law).
19. See Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000), for examples of
tunneling.
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firms where the controlling shareholder has relatively low cash-flow rights
to firms where the controlling shareholder has higher cash-flow rights.20
Several studies have documented that private benefits of control often
take the form of “tunneling” in a wide range of countries.21 For instance,
one study found that in India it is not uncommon for more than 25% of the
profits in firms where the controlling shareholder had low cash-flow rights
to be transferred to firms where the controlling shareholder has high cashflow rights when there is a positive shock to the firm’s cash flow.22 Studies
that have measured the private benefits of control enjoyed by controlling
shareholders have consistently found that control of a company is typically
worth a great deal, indicating that as a result of their control, controlling
shareholders receive benefits (including via diversionary activities such as
“tunneling”) not generally available to other shareholders. In Italy, for
instance, the average value of control is worth an amazing 37% of the
equity value of the firm.23 More generally, control was worth, on average,
an impressive 14% of the equity value of the firm in a sample of thirty-nine
countries. The sample included both developing and developed countries
ranging from Colombia to the United States.24 Nevertheless there is wide
variation across countries. At one extreme, the estimated value of control in
some countries, like Brazil, is in the range of 65% of the equity value of the
firm. At the other extreme, corporate control in Japan is estimated to be
worth negative 4% of the equity value of the firm.25
B. DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE DIVERSION
Widespread diversion of firm assets by controlling shareholders has
implications for firms’ disclosure decisions. There are good reasons to
believe that the more firms engage in diversion of corporate resources, all
else being equal, the more the controlling shareholders will prefer to keep
these activities hidden from public view.26 A lax disclosure regime will
likely have the effect of making it easier for controlling shareholders to
20. See generally id.
21. See infra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
22. Marianne Bertrand, Paras Mehta & Sendhil Mullainathan, Ferreting out Tunneling: An
Application to Indian Business Groups, 47 Q. J. ECON. 121 (2002).
23. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International
Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 551 (2004).
24. Id. Other studies have likewise found that corporate control has, on average, a substantial
economic value. See Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A
Cross-Country Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325 (2003); Luigi Zingales, The Value of the Voting
Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 125 (1994); cf. Luigi
Zingales, What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?, 110 Q. J. ECON. 1047 (1995). These
studies find a substantial value placed on owning the control block in most cases, despite the fact
that control block ownership entails some potential costs as well, such as a lack of diversification.
25. Dyck & Zingales, supra note 23, at 551.
26. This preference can exist even if everyone knows that firms, on average, are engaged in
these activities.
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divert corporate resources to their benefit: The more information there is
available about a firm’s operations, assets and ownership, the easier it is for
shareholders and regulators to uncover when, how and to whom diversion is
occurring.
Detection of diversion through increased disclosure might have a
number of unwanted consequences for the controlling shareholder.
Detection might lead, of course, to legal action. Even in countries with poor
legal protections for investors there is some legal response, at least
sporadically, to expropriation of firm assets that is sufficiently egregious.27
Indeed, in extreme enough cases, public pressure might provoke action
from regulators. In addition to any legal consequences, there might well be
reputational costs for a controlling shareholder that has been publicly
identified as particularly likely to engage in egregious conduct.
Furthermore, recent empirical work suggests that a reputation for
transparency and good governance can affect firm valuation.28
The empirical evidence is consistent with the view that it can be in the
strong self-interest of controlling shareholders who enjoy high levels of
private benefits of control for there to be low levels of firm transparency.29
One study found that the higher the level of private benefits of control of
firms in a country, the lower the level of disclosure (as captured by the
degree of earnings management firms engage in) by firms in that country.30
This study consisted of a sample of thirty-one countries, including
developing as well as developed countries. Another recent finding is that an
increase in mandatory disclosure requirements in a country is associated
with a substantially lower level of private benefits of control for controlling
shareholders in that country.31
Increased disclosure can reduce the private benefits of control. Todd
Mitton conducted an important study of firms from Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand during the East Asian financial
crisis of 1997–1998 and found that firms with high levels of disclosure (by

27. See Christian Leuz & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Political Relationships, Global Financing
and Corporate Transparency 3 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No. 03-16, 2003),
available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/03/0316.pdf.
28. See Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S.
Securities Laws?, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 319 (2005).
29. This is not to say, of course, that the only factor affecting the level of private benefits of
control is transparency, or even, more generally, the quality of the regulatory regime. Other nonlegal factors have been found to be important. See, e.g., Marco Pagano & Paulo Volpin, The
Political Economy of Finance, 17 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 502 (2001). It is worth bearing in
mind, by way of caution, that none of these studies definitively establish a causal link between
firms’ disclosure preferences and the level of private benefits of control (as is typically the case
for studies in this area).
30. See Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 27.
31. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works in
Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1, 16, 19 (2006) (two-standard-deviation increase in their “disclosure
index” associated with a 13% decrease in the premium paid for control blocks).
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virtue of having securities trading in the United States or having an auditor
from a (then) “Big Six” accounting firm) had substantially better stock
return performance during the crisis.32 One plausible explanation for these
abnormal stock returns is that diversion of corporate resources is likely to
be particularly severe during financial crises,33 but firms with high levels of
disclosure experienced lower levels of corporate diversion because of the
increased transparency of any diversion that is undertaken.
Another piece of evidence comes from studies of firms that cross-list.
Empirical research has found that the benefits to firms from countries with
weak disclosure and investor-protection regimes of cross-listing onto U.S.
exchanges are often substantial. Cross-listings are associated with more
accurate analyst forecasts—arguably an indication of a richer information
environment—and increased firm valuation.34 Improvements in firm
valuation are particularly significant for firms cross-listing from countries
with the weakest disclosure and investor-protection regimes.35 Despite the
apparent substantial benefits of cross-listing, relatively few of the firms
eligible for cross-listing take advantage of this opportunity. Less than 10%
of firms eligible for cross-listing onto the U.S. markets do so.36 Many firms
are apparently satisfied with their regulatory environments and the
associated high levels of private benefits of control, despite the cost to firm
valuation.
Another study investigated the effect of a country having an active
media on the level of private benefits enjoyed by controlling shareholders.37
The effects were quite strong. A one-standard-deviation increase in the
level of the active press variable translated into a reduction in the value of
the private benefits of control by 6.4%.38 This evidence is consistent with an
increased ability of the public to scrutinize questionable behavior, in this
case through the press, limiting the ability of controlling shareholders to
extract private benefits.
Other studies have focused on politically connected firms and firm
transparency. Again, the evidence demonstrates that firms prefer to avoid
32. Mitton, supra note 9, at 217 (stating that having an ADR resulted in a higher stock return
relative to other firms during the East Asian crisis of 10.8% and having a Big Six accounting firm
was associated with a higher return of 8.1%).
33. See Johnson et al., supra note 9, at 142 (arguing that expropriation increased during the
crisis).
34. Mark H. Lang, Karl V. Lins & Darius P. Miller, ADRs, Analysts, and Accuracy: Does
Cross Listing in the United States Improve a Firm’s Information Environment and Increase
Market Value?, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 317 (2003).
35. See Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in
the U.S. Worth More? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8538, 2001),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8538.pdf.
36. Id. at 1.
37. See Dyck & Zingales, supra note 23, at 582–86 (where the level of activity of the press
was proxied by the number of newspapers sold per 100,000 residents).
38. Id. at 586.
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demanding disclosure regimes that might publicly expose uncomfortable
facts. For example, politically connected firms in Indonesia during the reign
of Soeharto, were significantly less likely to have securities publicly traded
abroad.39 More specifically, these firms were significantly less likely to
have debt or equity traded on the U.S exchanges and thereby avoided U.S.
disclosure requirements.40 One plausible explanation for this finding is that
these firms desired to hide questionable transactions with their political
backers and state-owned banks. Causation is difficult to establish, however,
as the availability of favorable financing from state banks could have
reduced the need for external finance.41
Of course, the mere fact that controlling shareholders might want to opt
into a lax disclosure regime does not by itself indicate that such a decision
is socially undesirable. It is possible that the controlling shareholder values
the diverted resources as much as the shareholders who would otherwise be
the beneficiaries.42 In other words, diversion of corporate resources might
constitute a mere transfer with no net social loss. Moreover, the ability to
engage in diversion might conceivably serve as compensation to the
controller for the costs associated with monitoring the firm’s managers.
These costs might include a lack of diversification and liquidity associated
with holding a large control block of stock in a single company and the time
and effort incurred by the controller in the course of monitoring firm
management.43
When evaluating how likely it is that there are no net social losses
associated with a lax disclosure regime, two considerations need to be kept
in mind. First, even if private benefits of control merely represent a transfer
from minority shareholders to controlling shareholders or efficient
compensation for the monitoring services provided by the controller, the
effects of a lax disclosure regime—adopted as a means to protect these
transfers—on competition, growth and financial development must be
considered. Once these effects are taken into account, it is questionable how
innocuous the decision to opt into a poor disclosure regime really is. The
empirical evidence suggests that the effects of lax disclosure regimes on
competition, growth and financial development are both detrimental and
nontrivial.44
39.
40.
41.
42.

Leuz & Olberholzer-Gee, supra note 27, at 3.
See id.
See id. at 3–4 (discussing this possibility).
Most models of expropriation, however, do assume that there is a cost associated with
diversion of corporate resources. See, e.g., Mike Burkhart, Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, Why
Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders, 106 J. POL. ECON. 172 (1998).
43. See Anat R. Admati, Paul Pfleiderer & Josef Zechner, Large Shareholder Activism, Risk
Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1097 (1994) (discussing the costs
associated with holding large blocks). Of course, if control is guaranteed by holding shares with
disproportionate voting rights, the diversification and liquidity costs of control will be reduced.
44. See discussion infra Part III.C. for a discussion of this evidence.
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Second, it is also worth emphasizing that once firms have sold shares to
minority shareholders, controlling shareholders will not necessarily find a
mandatory disclosure regime in their self-interest for the simple reason that
some of the benefits of such a regime will accrue to the benefit of minority
shareholders.45 Minority shareholders would benefit because they were able
to initially purchase their shares at a discount reflecting a higher expected
level of diversion than is possible under a more demanding, mandatory
disclosure regime.46 Selling shares at such a discount might be the optimal
course of action if it turns out that, at the time the shares were sold, no
demanding disclosure regime was available and supporting the creation of
such a demanding disclosure regime was either infeasible or would have
created potentially unwanted competition.
On a more general note, research has found that there is a negative
correlation between the presence of controlling shareholders and the
strength of the legal protections provided to investors.47 One common
explanation for this finding is that as private benefits of control are lower
and hence the attractiveness of retaining control reduced, the stronger are
the legal protections of investors (such as mandatory disclosure
requirements).48 Outside investors, such as non-controlling shareholders,
will be willing to pay more for claims on the firm’s profits given the lower
level of expected diversion of corporate resources.

45. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Ownership and Governance, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 69, 83–92 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004).
46. See Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and Equity Markets, 66 J.
FIN. ECON. 3, 17–18 (2002). The Shleifer-Wolfenzon model is cast in terms of investors’ legal
protections. Their model is easily adopted to apply to disclosure requirements. See Michael
Greenstone, Paul Oyer & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and
the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments, 121 Q. J. ECON. 399, 406 (2006), for an adoption of
Shleifer-Wolfenzon model to the mandatory disclosure requirement context.
47. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate
Ownership around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999). The La Porta et al. “anti-directors” index, a
measure of the strength of legal protections provided investors, does not include mandatory
disclosure requirements as one of its elements. However, using an index that includes mandatory
disclosure requirements appears to capture more of the important aspects of differences across
countries than does the “anti-directors” index. See La Porta et al., supra note 31. Moreover,
disclosure levels of firms in a country and that country’s “anti-directors” index are, not
surprisingly, highly correlated. See Christian Leuz, Dhananjay Nanda & Peter D. Wysocki,
Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison, 69 J. FIN. ECON.
505 (2003).
48. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and
Control (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7203, 1999), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7203.pdf (showing that fewer private benefits of control can lead to
more dispersed ownership structures).
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C. DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION
1. Reducing the Cost of External Finance
In addition to affecting the ability of controlling shareholders to divert
corporate resources, the presence of a demanding disclosure regime also
can lead to a lower cost of capital for firms reliant on external finance. This
consequence is potentially quite important for those firms that do not have
sufficient internal sources of capital to participate in investment
opportunities. This group of firms would likely include young firms with
high-growth prospects but relatively few internal sources of capital. Larger,
more established firms are more likely to have internal sources of capital
and ties to financial institutions that can provide credit.
There are at least three mechanisms by which a demanding disclosure
regime can reduce the cost of external finance: Reducing adverse selection
costs, reducing the level of private information held by traders and reducing
the expected level of diversion of corporate resources. Consider first the
effect of demanding disclosure on adverse selection costs. A standard set of
models in corporate finance indicates that there is an adverse selection cost
to raising external finance that can be reduced with improved disclosure. In
the absence of sufficient firm-specific public information, the market will
assign a positive probability that a firm with valuable assets—such as a firm
with substantial profits and promising growth prospects—is in fact a firm
with low-value assets.49 This makes it less likely that high-value firms will
raise external finance to fund attractive investment opportunities, as their
shares will sell at a discount to their true value. This discount represents the
adverse selection cost that these high-value firms experience when raising
external finance. High-value firms will be more likely to raise external
finance if improved disclosure of firm-specific information is available at
the time the firm is raising capital, given the increased ability of the market
to differentiate between high-value and low-value firms.50
The second reason why the cost of external finance might be lower in a
regime with demanding disclosure requirements is the effect such a regime
has on the level of private information that traders hold about the true value
of the firm. Credible, public firm disclosures can have the effect of
displacing information that was, or would have been, generated by privately
informed traders.51 This is important because recent theoretical and
49. The classic adverse selection papers are Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf,
Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do
Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1984) and Stewart C. Myers, The Capital Structure Puzzle, 39 J.
FIN. 575 (1984).
50. Consistent with this, voluntary levels of disclosure by firms are higher around the time
firms access the capital markets for capital. See Mark Lang & Russell Lundholm, Cross-Sectional
Determinants of Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosures, 31 J. ACCT. RES. 246 (1993).
51. For evidence that firm public disclosures can displace private information, see Stephen
Brown & Stephen A. Hillegeist, Disclosure Quality and Information Asymmetry (Goizueta Bus.
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empirical research indicates that securities with a high level of privateinformation trading have higher expected returns.52 And, of course, a higher
expected return, all else being equal, implies a higher cost of capital. This
association between levels of private-information trading and expected
returns suggests that there is value to a firm in not only credibly committing
to meeting demanding disclosure standards at the time external finance is
being raised, but also credibly committing at the same time to meeting
demanding disclosure requirements in the future as well.53
Finally, the availability of external finance can be enhanced by
mandatory disclosure because a firm can demand more per share if it is able
to credibly commit to a low level of diversion of corporate assets through
such a disclosure regime. The equity of a firm will be worth more because a
larger percentage of the firm’s profits will end up being used for the benefit
of all the shareholders. Moreover, an increase in the amount of publicly
available information could also have the effect of reducing the costs to
minority shareholders of monitoring controlling shareholders and
management to ensure that corporate diversion is not occurring.54 The
reduced cost of external finance for firms that have attractive investment
opportunities and can credibly commit to reduced levels of diversion can
result in a reallocation of capital from firms that have less attractive
investment opportunities to firms with more attractive investment
opportunities.55
A reduced cost of external finance for firms issuing securities also has
implications for the availability of venture capital financing for these firms
prior to the time they ultimately issue securities to the public. The option
for venture capitalists to “cash out” their investments by selling securities in
the firm to the public on favorable terms in the event that the company is
successful could very well make it more likely that venture capital funding
will be forthcoming in the first place.56 One study has documented that

Sch. Paper Series, Paper No. GBS-ACC-2005-001, 2005), available at http://gbspapers.library.
emory.edu/archive/00000131/.
52. Id. at 16.
53. See discussion infra Part V. for a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on this
association.
54. See Davide Lombardo & Marco Pagano, Law and Equity Markets: A Simple Model, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 343, 351 (Joseph A.
McCahery et al. eds., 2002) (modeling the effect of reduced monitoring costs on the equilibrium
rate of return on equity).
55. See Shleifer & Wolfenzon, supra note 46, at 16 (establishing this result when capital is not
perfectly mobile across countries).
56. See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 255–56 (1998).

2007]

The Case for Mandatory Disclosure

95

venture capital funding increases in the wake of countries introducing more
demanding mandatory disclosure requirements.57
Empirical evidence clearly suggests that the presence of a demanding
disclosure regime enables firms (especially cash-poor, high-growth firms)
to raise needed external finance on favorable terms. Studies have found that
many of the firms that cross-list in the United States, and thereby commit
themselves to the U.S. disclosure regime, are in fact cash-poor, high-growth
firms from countries with poor disclosure regimes (and poor investor
protections generally) that need to raise external finance.58 Cross-listing,
either through reputational or legal bonding, apparently enables firms to
credibly commit to a demanding disclosure regime.
More generally, countries whose firms have higher levels of
transparency in their earnings reports enjoy lower costs of capital.59
Consistent with this, industries and firms in countries with strong investor
protection requirements rely more on external finance to raise capital. For
instance, countries with stronger investor protection requirements have a
larger number of firms going public (relative to the country’s GDP).60
Comparing the relative success of the different securities regulations
instituted by the Czech Republic and Poland in the 1990s is instructive.61
One of the most striking differences between these countries’ two regimes
was in their disclosure requirements. While Poland imposed demanding
disclosure requirements on firms with publicly traded securities, the Czech
Republic did very little. For instance, securities could not begin trading on
Poland’s markets unless a firm prospectus was available. The Czech
Republic required none. Poland required monthly, quarterly and semiannual disclosures by firms. The Czech Republic did not require any such
disclosures. Poland’s level of financial development, including initial public
offerings and the amount of external finance raised, far exceeded that of the

57. See RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 10, at 254 (discussing evidence gathered by Jorg
Kukies for his Ph.D. dissertation “Stock Markets for High-Technology Firms and Venture Capital
Financing”).
58. See Marco Pagano, Ailsa A. Röell & Josef Zechner, The Geography of Equity Listing:
Why Do Companies List Abroad?, 57 J. FIN. 2651 (2002) (discussing that high-growth firms in
need of external finance more likely to cross-list onto the U.S. markets); William A. Reese, Jr. &
Michael S. Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-listings in the United
States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 65 (2002) (showing that firms planning
to raise capital tend to cross-list).
59. See Utpal Bhattacharya, Hazem Daouk & Michael Welker, The World Price of Earnings
Opacity, 78 ACCT. REV. 641 (2003) (discussing the study of 34 countries over the 1985–1998
period).
60. See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, supra note 16, at
1142–45.
61. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons
from Securities Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1 (1999); Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson, &
Andrei Shleifer, Coase Versus the Coasians, 116 Q. J. ECON. 853 (2001).
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Czech Republic throughout the 1990s.62 Perhaps not coincidentally, the
private benefits of control in Poland were 11% of firm value, while in the
Czech Republic they were 58% of firm value.63
2. Increasing Competition
More demanding disclosure requirements have an important effect not
only on firms that rely on external finance, but also for those firms—such
as large, well-established, low-growth firms—that do not. Better financing
opportunities for potential competitors are generally not in the interests of
these firms.64 Therefore, in addition to protecting any private benefits of
control that may exist, these firms have an additional and separate reason to
be strongly opposed to the institution of a more demanding disclosure
regime. These firms will be opposed to a demanding disclosure regime
being made available to (potential) competitors that rely on external
finance. Recent evidence helps explain exactly how firms that do not rely
on external finance will be disadvantaged by improved disclosure
requirements.
Firms in industries with significant needs for external finance (highgrowth opportunities relative to internal cash flows), such as the
pharmaceutical industry with the substantial costs of drug development,
grew substantially faster during the 1980s in countries with more
demanding accounting-disclosure standards than firms in those same
industries in countries with weak accounting-disclosure standards.65 Equally
importantly, the same study found that there was more competition in these
external finance-dependent industries, as measured by the number of new
entrants, in countries with demanding accounting standards.66 In other
words, in industries that rely heavily on external finance for funding,
competition increased as a result of the presence of demanding mandatory
disclosure requirements. The people harmed by demanding disclosure
requirements in environments with more demanding mandatory disclosure
requirements appear to be firms with sufficient sources of internal capital
for their investments as a result of the increased competition they face.
Or consider the effect on a firm from a country with a poor disclosure
regime of other firms from that country cross-listing onto a foreign
exchange. A few studies have examined the effect of a firm’s decision to
62. See Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson, & Andrei Shleifer, Coase Versus the Coasians, 116
Q. J. ECON. 853 (2001) (comparing financial development of Czech Republic and Poland during
the 1990s).
63. See Dyck & Zingales, supra note 23, at 563.
64. See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial
Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003) (examining the effect of
openness to capital flows and trade on the politics surrounding financial development).
65. See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM.
ECON. REV. 559 (1998).
66. See id. at 572.
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cross-list onto the U.S. markets on similarly situated firms that do not crosslist. These studies have found that firms not cross-listing experience a
negative stock price reaction.67 One needs to be cautious, however, in
interpreting these findings. While these studies do indicate that non-crosslisted firms are apparently harmed by the cross-listing decisions of other
firms, it is not clear from these studies what is responsible for this negative
price reaction. The prospect of increased competition due to increased
access to capital for a firm’s rivals, or the possibility that the market draws
a negative inference about the non-listing firms (such as their growth
prospects) are just two possible causes.
The ability of a firm to credibly commit to a demanding disclosure
regime not only increases competition in the product market by funding
new entrants, but can also increase competition among firms for capital.
This can lead some firms to oppose a demanding mandatory disclosure
regime even if they have not yet sold (but are planning to sell) shares to the
public. If capital is not perfectly mobile across borders (i.e. the supply of
capital is not perfectly elastic), a situation which appears to be the case for
most countries,68 then the enhanced ability of some firms to receive external
finance by credibly committing to a demanding disclosure regime implies
that the country’s interest rate increases.69 More demand for external
finance, all else being equal, implies a higher interest rate in equilibrium
given the fact that capital is scarce. Firms that are planning a securities
offering now face, unhappily, a higher discount rate (i.e. the economy’s
interest rate) for the shares they are selling. Indeed, some firms will not be
able to raise sufficient capital by selling shares unless they operate in a lax
disclosure regime, given the higher discount rate associated with increased
competition for capital.
Supporting these theoretical predictions on the effect of a legal regime
on risk-adjusted returns, Davide Lombardo and Marco Pagano found that
countries with higher-quality legal regimes (as captured by indexes that
capture a country’s respect for the rule of law and the efficiency of the
country’s judicial system) have higher risk-adjusted returns.70 Also
67. See Michael Melvin & Magali Valero-Tonone, The Effects of International Cross-Listing
on Rival Firms (2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=472723;
Dong W. Lee, Why Does Shareholder Wealth Increase When Non-U.S. Firms Announce Their
Listing in the U.S.? (Aug. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=422960.
68. See Geert Bekaert & Campbell R. Harvey, Time-Varying World Market Integration, 50 J.
FIN. 403 (1995); Campbell R. Harvey, Predictable Risk and Returns in Emerging Markets, 8 REV.
FIN. STUD. 773 (1995).
69. There are several formal models that capture these effects on the interest rate. See
Lombardo & Pagano, supra note 54; Shleifer & Wolfenzon, supra note 46, at 17–18.
70. Davide Lombardo & Marco Pagano, Legal Determinants of the Return on Equity 13 (Ctr.
for Studies in Econ. & Fin., Working Paper No. 24, 2000), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=209310 (relying on the “Judicial Efficiency” variable produced by Business
International Corporation, and the “Anti-Director Rights” index constructed by La Porta et al.,
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consistent with these predictions is the finding in another recent study that
stock markets that impound more firm-specific information are associated
with an improvement in the allocation of capital across industries.71
Interestingly, other empirical studies have found that mandatory disclosure
is associated with more firm-specific information being impounded into
stock prices.72
Moreover, research has found that there is an improvement in capital
allocation in countries with strong legal protections for investors.73 This
improved allocation of capital from stronger legal protections resulted in
“declining industries” receiving less funding relative to those in firms with
better growth prospects. In other words, “declining industries” appear to be
losers in legal systems with more demanding investor rights.74
In short, there is an extensive (and growing) body of evidence that
supports the position that a number of firms have powerful reasons to be
opposed to more demanding disclosure requirements if this means that
these disclosure requirements will likewise be made available to other
firms. Improved disclosure can have the effect of increasing competition by
enabling firms without sufficient internal sources of capital to receive
funding. This competition can take the form of increased competition for
scarce capital and increased product-market competition. Competition, and
the “creative destruction” of firms that it unleashes, is potentially quite
threatening to established firms with internal sources of cash and wellestablished ties to banks and other financial institutions, as well as those
firms that wish not to compete with others for the external finance they
receive.
It is worth emphasizing that the desire to suppress competition through
neglect of the legal infrastructure necessary to create and support robust
competition can exist even if there are no controlling shareholders who
enjoy, and wish to continue to enjoy, substantial private benefits of control.
Moreover, firms can have this preference for a lax disclosure regime for this
anti-competitive reason even at the time they are selling shares to the
public, despite the discount in share price this will cause.
Of course, when there are substantial private benefits of control present,
studies indicate that there is likely a real, and potentially quite significant,
cost in terms of foregone competition, growth and financial development
resulting from a preference on the part of controlling shareholders for a lax
which “captures the degree of legal protection from expropriation by the managers and controlling
shareholders granted to minority shareholders”).
71. Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 187
(2000) (dataset consists of 65 countries over a thirty-three year period).
72. See Fox et al., supra note 4.
73. Wurgler, supra note 71.
74. The Wurgler study did not, however, focus on mandatory disclosure requirements separate
from other legal protections for investors. Id. The two, however, are highly correlated. See supra
note 31 and accompanying text.
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disclosure regime as a means of retaining their ability to divert corporate
resources unimpeded. This is true even if such diversion is a mere transfer
between shareholders or such diversion represents, in part, compensation to
the controller for its monitoring costs.
D. FIRMS THAT STILL WANT TO COMMIT
As noted, there will undoubtedly be some firms that do want to commit
to a high-quality disclosure regime. This group might include some
controlling shareholders who are willing to forgo the opportunity to divert
some corporate resources in order to capture the increase in the value of the
controller’s ownership stake associated with operating under a high-quality
disclosure regime. In other words, the controller’s share of the efficiency
gains from selecting a higher quality disclosure regime might, if the
magnitude is sufficiently large, more than offset the controller’s decreased
ability to divert corporate resources.75 While substantial private benefits of
control are common around the world, there are still a number of countries
where the average private benefits are modest. Even in situations where
private benefits of control are high, some controlling shareholders might
want to attempt to capture the efficiency gains from improved corporate
governance by purchasing the minority shareholder stakes at depressed
prices and then commit to a firm-value-maximizing disclosure (and
investor-rights protection) regime.76 Finally, this group of willing firms will
also likely include some firms that need to raise external finance and
venture capital funding to capitalize on investment opportunities.
All this leads to the following question: Why should policymakers be
concerned about the disclosure levels of those firms that want to credibly
commit to a disclosure regime that maximizes firm valuation and reduces
the cost of external finance? If there are firms that wish to so commit will
not the market or a responsive government provide a means for these firms
to do so? As it turns out, there are powerful reasons why government and
the market might not provide the necessary tools for this group of firms to
credibly commit to a high-disclosure regime even when such firms find it in
their self-interests to do so.

75. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
69 (Jeffery N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004).
76. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 58 (discussing the possibility that controlling
shareholders will use freeze-out mergers and coercive tender offers to purchase minority shares).
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IV. CAN FIRMS CREDIBLY COMMIT?
A. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF VESTED INTERESTS
There are four different possibilities for how a firm might credibly
commit to a demanding disclosure regime. First, the government, perhaps
responding to firm demand for better disclosure requirements, could
provide such a disclosure regime. Second, the exchange in the firm’s
country, through its listing requirements, could insist that certain disclosure
standards be met by exchange-listed firms. Third, firms in countries with
lax disclosure regimes might cross-list onto exchanges in countries that
provide a more demanding disclosure regime. Fourth, firms in their
individual capacities could attempt, through various contractual and
corporate charter provisions, to create such a regime for themselves.
Whether government responds to the demands of some firms to make
improved disclosure standards available to them will be impacted by the
opposition of other firms—often the larger, well-established firms—to the
prospect of increased competition. It is not surprising that in many instances
governments around the world, perhaps responding to this powerful interest
group, have failed to provide the legal infrastructure that would enable
firms to commit to a high-quality disclosure regime, despite the possibility
that there are firms that so desire.77 The true costs to the public at large of
such inaction are often not readily apparent.
When considering the likely response by domestic exchanges to a
demand for improved disclosure requirements, it is worth bearing in mind
that a number of the likely firm beneficiaries of improved access to external
finance and venture capital are likely not even listed, or eligible for listing,
on an exchange, given their firm size and stage of development. Indeed,
some exchanges require that a firm be profitable for a certain number of
years before the firm is even eligible for listing. That excludes exactly those
firms that are least likely to have internal sources of capital or wellestablished ties to financial institutions. In other words, the beneficiaries of
improved disclosure standards will often be outsiders to the internal
decision-making process of the exchange when it is setting its listing
standards. Not surprisingly, exchanges have proven quite responsive to the
demands of their largest listed firms—those firms least likely to be the
primary beneficiaries of a lower cost of external finance or increased
venture capital funding.
The famous one-share-one-vote controversy over the New York Stock
Exchange’s (NYSE) listing rules is a good illustration of this solicitousness.
Since 1926, the NYSE has had an exchange-listing rule expressly

77. See generally RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 10 (describing the politics surrounding
financial development).
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prohibiting dual-class common stock.78 When General Motors, one of the
larger NYSE-listed companies, issued dual-class common stock in 1982 in
clear violation of this rule, the NYSE refused to take any action against
General Motors. Indeed, the NYSE seriously considered changing its
longstanding rule prohibiting dual-class common stock in response to
General Motors’ actions. The issue was finally moot when the SEC stepped
in and restricted the use of dual-class common through regulation.79
There is also some evidence that a similar dynamic was at work in the
pre-mandatory disclosure period in the United States. The NYSE appeared
to be reluctant to impose meaningful disclosure requirements on listed firms
at the turn of the century due to the opposition of firms with controlling
shareholders, often families, who preferred not to be bound to disclose
information.80 Not until the exchange was under intense governmental
pressure did the NYSE meaningfully improve its disclosure requirements in
1910.81
The refusal of government or an exchange to create or enforce a
meaningful disclosure regime can, of course, be a reasonable decision.
Creating a mandatory disclosure regime, with meaningful levels of
enforcement, is an expensive and, perhaps even more importantly,
complicated undertaking. To the extent there is court involvement in
enforcement, perhaps adjudicating lawsuits or reviewing a governmental
agency’s enforcement actions, the court system must be up to the task. This
includes tolerable levels of judicial corruption and some minimal level of
expertise on the part of judges in assessing the merits of these actions. The
same will be true for any private enforcement and adjudication process that
might be established by an exchange. In addition, establishing workable
definitions of concepts likely to be central in any mandatory disclosure
regime, such as what constitutes a “material” misstatement, is likely to
prove, if the U.S. experience is any guide,82 to be a complicated endeavor.
Moreover, there will inevitably be a need in any mandatory disclosure
regime for regulations and guidelines to be continually clarified and
updated as business conditions change and new fact patterns present
themselves.

78. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of
Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1988), for a detailed discussion of this episode. The rule,
incidentally, received significant academic support as good policy. See Marcel Kahan, Some
Problems with Stock Exchange-Based Securities Regulation, 83 VA. L. REV. 1509 (1997).
79. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (2005).
80. See David F. Hawkins, The Development of Modern Financial Reporting Practices Among
American Manufacturing Corporations, in MANAGING BIG BUSINESS 166, 166–67 (Richard S.
Tedlow & Richard R. John, Jr. eds., 1986).
81. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. See generally James Davis, Corporate Disclosure
Through the Stock Exchanges (Apr. 24, 1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
82. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230–36 (1988) (applying the standard of
materiality defined in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)).
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The costs that a country or an exchange must incur if it is going to
establish a meaningful mandatory disclosure regime for firms with publicly
traded securities are thus clearly non-trivial. Incurring these costs at any
point in time will only make sense if there is a sufficient number of firms
with publicly traded securities, or firms considering going public, that
might benefit from such a regime at that time.
But this creates a serious timing problem. In a situation where there is,
perhaps quite reasonably, a poor disclosure and investor-rights regime, the
most efficient system might very well be the presence of controlling
shareholders who can monitor management and internalize the costs of
expropriation.83 And, in fact, developing countries have a strong tendency
towards concentrated ownership.84 Controlling shareholders of firms that
already have minority shareholders by the time it begins to make sense to
incur the costs of establishing a mandatory disclosure regime will have an
incentive to oppose a change in the disclosure regime irrespective of
whether the change is being considered by government or the firms’
exchange(s).85 Likewise, entrenched managers of firms with dispersed
ownership structures will attempt to protect any private benefits of control
they enjoy. To make matters more difficult, non-controlling shareholders of
these firms might also find it in their interest to oppose the adoption of a
more demanding disclosure regime, even if this would reduce the incidence
of corporate diversion by controlling shareholders and entrenched managers
to their benefit, if the result is likely to be an increased level of competition
faced by the firm.
This is not to say that these vested interests can never be overcome; that
is obviously false. It is merely to say that the fact that firms in a country or
an exchange operate under a lax disclosure regime does not imply that
mandated disclosure cannot substantially improve matters. To this point, the
analysis has focused on the political economy implications of having firms
with a vested interest in a lax disclosure regime. But how does the
willingness of an exchange to impose demanding disclosure requirements
through its listing standards change when competition between exchanges is
introduced?

83. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737
(1997); Morten Bennedsen & Daniel Wolfenzon, The Balance of Power in Closely Held
Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 113 (2000); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and
Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002).
84. Although there does appear to be more separation of cash-flow and voting rights than is
optimal. See Bebchuk, supra note 48.
85. See Shleifer & Wolfenzon, supra note 46, at 17–18.
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B. COMPETITION BETWEEN DOMESTIC EXCHANGES
1. Theory
It is argued that desire to attract the trading volume of investors will
ensure that exchanges institute demanding disclosure requirements as a
prerequisite to listing on the exchange. This is so because investors value
disclosure and will route their stock orders accordingly. Based on this
reasoning, Paul Mahoney and others have argued that exchanges should be
vested with the responsibility of setting disclosure standards.86
How this competition for trading volume and listing business will work
out has been fleshed out in different ways. Mahoney, for instance, argues
that “[o]ne important source of risk [to investors] is the divergence of
investor viewpoints about the company’s performance. The company can
reduce this divergence by making financial and other disclosures.”87 As a
result, this will increase the “desirability of listed companies as investment
vehicles.”88 Huddart, Hughes and Brunnermeier (HHB), to take another
prominent example, have attempted to capture in a formal model the
intuition that exchanges competing to maximize trading volume will offer
demanding disclosure standards.89
In the HHB model, exchanges will attempt to capture the trading done
by uninformed, liquidity traders—traders who have no private information
about the firms’ true values but need to trade given their liquidity needs—
even while simultaneously attempting to attract listings from firms whose
corporate insiders wish to engage in insider trading.90 The model implies
that there will be a “race to the top”91 for disclosure standards. That
argument relies on the plausible assumption that uninformed liquidity
traders prefer not to trade, all else being equal, against informed traders. An
exchange with a demanding disclosure regime reduces the likelihood in
their model that uninformed liquidity traders are trading against informed
traders. Corporate insiders prefer to conduct their trades where they can
“hide” among a large number of liquidity traders even at the expense of
having some of their private information publicly revealed as a result of the
exchange disclosure rules. Hence, exchanges will voluntarily offer

86. Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 (1998); see also
Edmund W. Kitch, Competition Between Securities Markets: Good or Bad?, in THE FUTURE FOR
THE GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKET: LEGAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS 233 (Fidelis Oditah ed.,
1996).
87. Mahoney, supra note 86, at 1458.
88. Id.
89. Steven Huddart, John S. Hughes & Markus Brunnermeier, Disclosure Requirements and
Stock Exchange Listing Choice in an International Context, 26 J. ACCT. & ECON. 237 (1999).
90. Id. at 243.
91. Id. at 237.
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demanding disclosure standards given their preference, a preference shared
by corporate insiders,92 to attract the trades of liquidity traders.
Neither of these particular lines of reasoning is entirely convincing. As
for the Mahoney argument, the precise connection between the desirability
of a security as an investment and divergence of investor viewpoints is not
spelled out. Even assuming that a decrease in the divergence of investor
viewpoints will result in reduced systematic risk, this will not necessarily
render the securities more attractive as an investment, as the risk-adjusted
return will, in an efficient market, remain the same. Investors will simply
enjoy a lower return as a result of bearing less systematic risk. At this point,
the relative attractiveness of securities with high disclosure and those with
low disclosure as an investment will remain the same.
Nor does the HHB model constitute a firm basis for arguing that
exchanges will institute demanding disclosure requirements and, thereby,
ensure that listed firms meet demanding disclosure standards even in the
absence of mandatory disclosure. The HHB model normalizes all securities
returns, regardless of where the security trades, to zero.93 It is this
assumption that drives their conclusion that liquidity traders have a
preference for high-disclosure exchanges given the fact that the only
difference between securities trading on different exchanges is the
probability of incurring a loss by trading against informed traders.
However, it is very much an open question in the finance literature whether
securities with higher levels of informed trading have the same return as
securities with lower levels of informed trading.94 Fundamentally, they
formally make the assumption implicit in Mahoney’s argument: Exchange
features that are unattractive to investors, such as lax disclosure standards,
are not priced by the market.
Most importantly, neither argument addresses what happens when
exchange rules affect the ability of those who control firms to engage in
diversion of corporate assets or the level of competition faced by the
firms—an ability, incidentally, that is not obviously affected by which
exchange attracts liquidity traders. An exchange will have a powerful
incentive to provide a lax disclosure regime if enough listed companies on
an exchange, or firms eligible for listing on that exchange, have an interest
in a poor disclosure regime. This will be so even if it implies a higher cost
of external finance for firms as a result of undesirable exchange rules being
priced by the market. Indeed, an attempt by an exchange to maximize
trading volume might very well lead it to offer a lax disclosure regime so as
to maximize the number of listed securities traded on the exchange.

92. Id. at 240.
93. Id. at 243.
94. See discussion infra Part V.
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The experience of the U.S. in the pre-mandatory disclosure period (pre1933) has often been relied upon in attempting to figure whether exchanges
will adopt demanding disclosure requirements out of self-interest. This
experience may provide useful insights into the issue.
2. The U.S.’s Pre-Mandatory Disclosure Experience
A common claim is that the existence of demanding disclosure
requirements imposed by exchanges in the U.S. in the decades immediately
prior to the imposition of mandatory disclosure in the 1930s is powerful
evidence that exchanges, left unencumbered, have the proper incentives
when setting disclosure requirements through their listing standards.95
During this pre-mandatory disclosure period, the NYSE, while the most
important exchange, faced domestic competition from some thirty-three
other exchanges, some with significant trading volume. And, indeed, it is
true that the disclosure standards a firm had to meet as a condition to listing
on the NYSE, as of 1931, were extensive.96 Firms had to provide balance
sheets and income statements for the prior two years and earnings
statements for the prior five years. These balance sheets and income
statements had to be updated periodically. Firms also had to provide a
written description of how they calculated depreciation. Depreciation
methods could not be changed without publicly providing details of any
change in a firm’s annual report.97
There are several reasons, however, for why the demanding nature of
the NYSE’s listing requirements circa 1931 is not as powerful a piece of
evidence against the need for mandatory disclosure as often claimed. The
NYSE’s requirement that firms update their financial statements—a crucial
component of any meaningful disclosure regime—were in fact, in large
part, a result of governmental pressure. Prior to the Panic of 1907, the
NYSE placed no general obligation on listed firms to periodically update
their financial information.98 Moreover, at this time the NYSE allowed
securities of firms not listed on the exchange nevertheless to trade on it (socalled unlisted trading). These unlisted firms did not have to meet the
disclosure requirements contained in the NYSE’s listing standards. The
volume of unlisted trading transactions on the NYSE was substantial, with
very little disclosure by these unlisted firms.99

95.
96.
97.
98.

See Mahoney, supra note 86.
See id. at 1466, 1477–78.
See id. at 1465–67.
See generally Davis, supra note 81. The NYSE did in 1895, however, recommend that
firms update their financial statements. MARK L. LARSON, TECHNICAL CHARTING FOR PROFITS
17 (2001). Moreover, some firms agreed in their listing agreements to distribute annual reports.
99. See Hawkins, supra note 80, at 181 (“The companies whose stocks were noted by the
Unlisted Department (mainly industrials) were not required to furnish the Exchange with financial
information relevant to the issue.”).
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The Hughes Commission, established by the state of New York in the
aftermath of the Panic of 1907, was charged with investigating the practices
of the NYSE.100 As a result of its investigation, the Hughes Commission
Report (the Report) recommended that the NYSE “adopt methods to
compel the filing of frequent statements of the financial condition of the
companies whose securities are listed, including balance sheets [and]
income . . . accounts.”101 Moreover, the Report recommended that the
“unlisted department, except for temporary issues, [ ] be abolished.”102
Wisely, the NYSE adopted most of the Report’s recommendations,
including enforcing an obligation to periodically update balance sheet and
income statements and prohibiting unlisted trading.103
The NYSE was not alone. The New York Curb Exchange, an important
competitor to the NYSE, was strongly criticized in the Report for its lack of
listing standards. After the Report came out, the New York Curb Exchange
adopted listing standards.104 These listing standards were later significantly
strengthened in the aftermath of the crash of 1929, when the New York
Curb Exchange’s practices were the subject of Senate hearings.
However, while the NYSE had extensive disclosure requirements in
place by 1931, it is highly questionable whether there was any meaningful
enforcement. The only penalty that the NYSE could impose for noncompliance was de-listing. Not surprisingly, this was an action undertaken
in only the rarest of cases. And while unlisted trading was barred on the
NYSE after 1910,105 unlisted trading, with little or no disclosure
requirements, continued to constitute a substantial portion of trading on
many of the other exchanges.
None of this is to suggest that exchanges have no incentive to impose
disclosure standards. Nor does the U.S. history of listing standards even
show that exchanges in the pre-mandatory disclosure period adopted
insufficiently rigorous disclosure standards. A recital of disclosure
standards and enforcement mechanisms cannot establish this. What the
historical evidence canvassed above does undermine, though, is the
common claim106 that the pre-1933 U.S. experience demonstrates that
100. Moreover, there was proposed legislation at the national level to regulate the NYSE. See
Davis, supra note 81, at 23.
101. W. C. VAN ANTWERP, THE STOCK EXCHANGE FROM WITHIN 425 (1913) (quoting the
Hughes Commission Report).
102. Id.
103. See Hawkins, supra note 80, at 181 (“Subsequently, in 1910, under growing threats of
government regulation, the New York Stock Exchange abolished its Unlisted Department.”);
Regulation of the Stock Exchange: Hearing on S. 3895 Before the S. Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 63d Cong. 286 (1914) (explaining efforts of the New York Stock Exchange to ensure
that the Hughes Commission recommendation that there be more frequent reporting was actually
implemented).
104. See Davis, supra note 81, at 24.
105. See Hawkins, supra note 80, at 181.
106. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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demanding mandatory disclosure requirements are unnecessary because
exchanges will provide and enforce such requirements.
Not only did exchanges not demand and/or enforce disclosure
requirements before 1910, but most firms, rarely voluntarily submitted
meaningful annual reports during this period. Indeed, at this time many
important firms released no annual reports. The annual reports that were
released tended to be quite short, with relatively little in the way of detail.
Major companies, such as the International Silver Company and the
American Tin Plate Company, whose stock was traded on the NYSE,
released very few details of any sort in their annual reports. The Eastman
Kodak annual report of 1903107 is representative of a number of annual
reports of this time period. Nevertheless, there were still some companies—
most notably U.S. Steel, starting with its annual report of 1903—that did
provide relatively in-depth financial information.108 In short, the overall
level of disclosure contained in the annual reports during this time period
was low, but not uniformly low.
In considering the relevance of the U.S. experience to other countries, it
is worth noting that in many countries there simply is no meaningful
competition between domestic exchanges. Many countries have a single,
dominant domestic exchange where most order flow is executed. This is not
surprising given the powerful liquidity network externalities of trading:
Traders want to trade where other traders already are. Moreover, many
exchanges around the world are far from independent market organizations.
Government supervision and oversight of exchanges has historically been
far greater, for example, in Continental Europe than the United States.109
C. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION FOR LISTINGS
Competition between a country’s domestic exchanges is not, of course,
the only source of competitive pressure faced by a given exchange. There is
increasing international competition among exchanges, which undoubtedly
can powerfully change the incentive structure of exchanges. Perhaps the
most dramatic example of this is the response of the Scandanivian stock
exchanges to competition for investors’ orders from other European
exchanges.110 In response to this competitive challenge, the Scandanivan
stock exchanges (beginning with the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 1993111)

107. See Appendix infra.
108. Id.
109. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State
in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1 (2001).
110. David Ibison, Stockholm Plots Course as Financial Centre, FIN. TIMES, July 12, 2006, at
24.
111. In the process, the Stockholm Stock Exchange moved to an entirely electronic trading
platform and permitted remote access to their trading platforms by overseas investment banks.
This is further evidence of an effort by the Exchange to attract listings. Id.

108

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 2

demutualized, converting themselves into for-profit, shareholder-owned
organizations.
This international competition does not stop at order flow, but extends
to competition for listings. Listing standards, as well as execution services
for investors’ orders, are an important part of the “product” offered to firms
by exchanges. The most important example of this phenomenon is the
NYSE’s sustained efforts to attract cross-listings from firms around the
world, which the Exchange has done with considerable success:
Approximately 15% of all NYSE-listed firms are foreign firms.112
A firm’s listing on the U.S. markets, especially for firms from
developing countries with poor disclosure requirements (as well as poor
investor legal protections among a variety of other dimensions) does in fact
constitute an important mechanism by which a firm can commit to a higher
level of disclosure.113 Firms that list on a U.S. exchange are subject to many
of the basic U.S. disclosure requirements.114 These mandated disclosures
typically include disclosure of the identity of shareholders with more than
5% of the shares, along with the standard Exchange Act reports.
The ability of firms to cross-list on foreign exchanges, and thereby
bond themselves to more demanding disclosure regimes, does reduce the
need for mandatory disclosure with respect to firms whose decision-makers
find a more demanding disclosure regime in their self-interest. There is
some evidence that cross-listing is a successful strategy for these firms and
that the source of this success is, in part, due to bonding.115 Cross-listings
have been found to be beneficial to firms. They are associated with more
accurate analyst forecasts and increased firm valuation.116 Improved firm
valuation is particularly significant for firms cross-listing from countries
with weak disclosure and investor-protection regimes.117
112. See
New
York
Stock
Exchange,
Non-U.S.
Listed
Issuers,
http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/datalib/1022221393065.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
113. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global
Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641 (1999); René
M. Stulz, Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of Capital, 12 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8
(1999) for arguments along these lines.
114. See Securities Act Release No. 6493, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,435 (Oct. 6, 1983). One
noticeable exception is that foreign cross-listing firms are exempted from the requirement that
they disclose information concerning transactions with management when the firm is not already
disclosing this information to its shareholders. For further discussion of the disclosure
requirements of cross-listing firms, see generally Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster
Trap, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675, 680–82 (2002).
115. See Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, Why are Foreign Firms Listing in
the U.S. Worth More? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8538, 2001),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8538.pdf (arguing that other explanations for crosslisting cannot explain the pattern of cross-listings).
116. Mark H. Lang, Karl V. Lins, & Darius P. Miller, ADRs, Analysts, and Accuracy: Does
Cross Listing in the United States Improve a Firm’s Information Environment and Increase
Market Value?, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 317 (2003); see also Mitton, supra note 9, at 217.
117. Doidge et al., supra note 115, at 6.
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At the same time, the available evidence indicates that cross-listing is
still a highly imperfect substitute for having a strong disclosure regime in
the firm’s home country. SEC enforcement actions against cross-listed
firms are rare and often ineffective. Misconduct occurring in foreign
countries is hard to detect and a low enforcement priority for the SEC. The
traditional enforcement mechanisms are simply not well suited to crossborder actions.118
Finally, cross-listing is often not a feasible strategy for many firms that
are at a relatively early stage of development and need external finance.119
The disclosure regime for many firms is therefore largely limited to
whatever is offered by that firm’s home-country or domestic exchange.120
Moreover, of course, the possibility of cross-listing does not address the set
of firms that are content with a lax disclosure regime even when this creates
social costs.
D. FIRMS ACTING IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES
What if a demanding disclosure regime is not available to a firm from
its home country, domestic exchange or through cross-listing? Can a firm
credibly commit to a demanding disclosure regime through charter
provisions or other contractual arrangements? In other words, can a private
contract remedy deficiencies in governmental and exchange regulation?
The answer is very likely no, at least much of the time. All the
difficulties of establishing a mandatory disclosure regime apply a fortiori to
firms acting in their individual capacities. The ability of any individual
firm, through its charter provisions or other contractual arrangements, to
recreate for itself a credible mandatory disclosure regime is highly limited
regardless of the benefits. For example, the firm will find it difficult to
commit to disclosing bad information in the future. While this might be the
optimal commitment ex ante, firms will sometimes find it in their selfinterest ex post not to publicly release bad news.121 Without binding
contracts, spelled out in sufficient detail in advance and actually enforced
118. See supra note 28, at 321.
119. The empirical literature has found that firm size is an important determinant of whether a
firm cross-lists, suggesting that for smaller firms cross-listing is not a feasible strategy. See Marco
Pagano, Ailsa A. Röell, & Josef Zechner, The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do Companies
List Abroad?, 57 J. FIN. 2651, 2660, 2673–76 (2002).
120. Consistent with this, empirical research has found that local financial development is more
important to small firms’ ability to receive financing than it is for larger firms who are likely to
have access to additional sources of capital. See Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, & Luigi Zingales,
Does Local Financial Development Matter?, 119 Q. J. ECON. 929, 936–37 (2004).
121. A common conclusion of the theoretical literature on firms’ disclosure decisions is that
firms tend to have an incentive not to disclose bad news. There is strong evidence that U.S. firms
do attempt to avoid reporting poor earnings to the markets. See, e.g., David Burgstahler & Ilia
Dichev, Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Decreases and Losses, 24 J. ACCT. & ECON. 99
(1998); cf. François Degeorge, Jayendu Patel & Richard Zeckhauser, Earnings Management to
Exceed Thresholds, 72 J. BUS. 1 (1999).
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through the imposition of real penalties for non-compliance by courts or
private adjudicators, this will be virtually impossible to do.122 Moreover,
there are obvious economies of scale associated with implementing and
running a mandatory disclosure regime, such as a settled format for the
presentation of information, not easily achievable by a firm in isolation.
In addition, there is some evidence that suggests a firm’s ability to
commit to a demanding disclosure regime is affected by whether a country
has the infrastructure necessary to make such a commitment credible.
Specifically, a recent empirical study has found that the number of auditors
a country has (scaled by population) affects the opacity of firms’
disclosures in that country.123 An increase in the number of auditors in a
country decreases the opacity of firms’ earnings disclosures.124 Firms in
isolation will likely be unable to create the infrastructure, including a wellestablished auditing profession, necessary to support a credible disclosure
regime.
Indeed, the consistent finding in the law and finance literature that “law
matters” for firm valuation, specifically that the lack of certain legal rules
and institutions can harm firm valuation, indicates that firms are often
unable to employ contracting arrangements as an effective substitute for
their desired legal regime.125
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
The fact that there will often be no means for firms credibly to commit
to a demanding disclosure regime implies that making such a regime,
whether mandatory or not, available to these firms would constitute a
substantial and much-needed improvement for many countries. One could
imagine a number of ways such a change could occur, including making it
easier for firms to cross-list onto foreign exchanges.
The advantage of mandating a demanding disclosure regime lies in the
fact that not all firms will want to credibly commit to such a regime even
when it is socially beneficial for them to do so.126 Furthermore, and on a
more practical note, a crucial aspect of any disclosure regime is that firms
be credibly bound to disclose in the future, perhaps many years later,
information that the firm might not, at that point in time, wish to disclose.
Even if firms find it in their strong interests to bind themselves ex ante to a
122.
123.
124.
125.

See Rock, supra note 114, at 684–86; Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 75, at 94–95, 101–02.
See Bhattacharya et al., supra note 59, at 658, 659 Table 2.
Id.
Eric Friedman and Simon Johnson provide an interesting argument, building on the work
of Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76
AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986), that firms that find themselves stuck in a weak regulatory
environment use debt as a way, in part, to reduce expropriation. The use of debt, they point out,
has significant costs of its own, including lower levels of financing of investment opportunities
and increased exposure to economic crises. See Johnson et al., supra note 9.
126. See discussion supra Part III.
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demanding disclosure regime, say because the firm wishes to raise external
finance, there will be strong incentives for a firm to later switch to a less
demanding disclosure regime.
The most obvious and straightforward way to accomplish the necessary
commitment, especially in countries with weak overall legal infrastructures,
is to make disclosure requirements mandatory. There is no evidence, at this
point, to indicate that firms, especially firms in countries with weak legal
infrastructures, can in fact credibly bind themselves, through purely
contractual devices such as supermajority voting rules in the firm charters
not to engage in opportunistic abrogation of a previously chosen, more
demanding disclosure regime.127 In sharp contrast, there is substantial—and
growing—evidence, some of which has already been discussed, that
mandatory disclosure requirements can have a beneficial effect.128
Finally, it should not be overlooked that as a practical matter, many
countries face the decision whether to have a mandatory disclosure regime
or to leave matters as they currently stand. Policy analysis should shed
some light on this choice.
V. INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY AND THE DUPLICATIVE
INVESTMENT ARGUMENT FOR MANDATORY
DISCLOSURE
While there are strong arguments that mandatory disclosure can be
beneficial, this does not mean, of course, that all arguments for mandatory
disclosure are convincing. The “duplicative investment” argument for
mandatory disclosure is one of these.129 Given its prominence and
plausibility, this argument merits careful attention. This argument
ultimately depends on whether firms are willing and able to credibly
commit to a demanding disclosure regime.
The “duplicative investment” argument for mandatory disclosure
requirements is based on the highly plausible assumption that firms are the
cheapest cost producers of at least some firm-specific information relevant
to firm valuation. Mandatory disclosure is a way of ensuring that firms,
rather than traders, produce this information. In the absence of mandatory
disclosure, this information might instead be generated by traders who wish
to capitalize on this information in their trading. If the cost to traders of
generating this private information is higher than the cost to the firm of
127. But see Romano, The Need for Competition, supra note 2 (suggesting that contractual
devices and supermajority voting rules are sufficient to prevent opportunistic mid-stream
switching); cf. Rock, supra note 114 (emphasizing importance of credible ex ante commitment).
128. See infra Part VI for further discussion of this empirical evidence. See also supra Part III.
129. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 733 (1984) (“[A] major significance of a mandatory
disclosure system is that it can reduce these [duplicative investment] costs.”); Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 13, at 682.
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disclosing the information, then mandatory disclosure can play the socially
beneficial role of ensuring that these unnecessary costs are avoided.130
Paul Mahoney has argued that this reasoning is unconvincing because
there is no clear evidence that public disclosures required by mandated
disclosure actually contain information that has not already been
impounded into the stock price by privately informed traders prior to the
public disclosure.131 There is, however, substantial evidence that the
information contained in mandatory disclosures can have the effect of
displacing private information not already reflected in the stock price.132
Consider the empirical literature on the effect a firm’s mandated public
disclosures have on the bid-ask spread133 of that firm’s stock. If the public
information contained in the firm’s mandatory disclosure acts as a
substitute for private information then the effect of increased public
disclosure by a firm should be to reduce informational asymmetry (the
disparity between uninformed and informed investors). This should, in turn,
result in a reduction of the bid-ask spread, given the well-established fact
that a reduction in informational asymmetry in a stock will reduce the bidask spread of that stock, all else being equal.134
Indeed studies have borne this out. The SEC requirement that firms
report their performance broken down by business segment when the firm is
in more than one line of business has been found to reduce bid-ask
spreads.135 Similarly, the mandated disclosure of the value of oil and gas
reserves was also found to reduce bid-ask spreads.136 Firm disclosures of
management’s forecasts of what the future might hold for the company also
reduce bid-ask spreads.137
The reason that the “duplicative investment” argument is not a reason
standing alone to favor mandatory disclosure is that there are good reasons,
both theoretical and empirical, to believe that higher levels of informed
trading do in fact result in higher expected returns. However, as the
expected return on a firm’s security rises, so does the cost of external

130. Often relied upon in this context is the seminal paper by Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and
Social Value of Information and the Reward to Incentive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971)
which provides a model in which there can be socially inefficient levels of investment in
generating information.
131. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1097 (1995).
132. Marilyn Magee Greenstein & Heibatollah Sami, The Impact of the SEC’s Segment
Disclosure Requirement on Bid-Ask Spreads, 69 ACCT. REV. 179, 180 (1994).
133. This is the difference between the price at which a dealer is willing to buy an investor’s
security and the price at which a dealer is willing to sell the same security to an investor.
134. MAUREEN O’HARA, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE THEORY 54 (1995). See generally id.
135. Greenstein & Sami, supra note 132. This requirement was first imposed in 1970. Id.
136. Jeffery P. Boone, Oil and Gas Reserve Value Disclosures and Bid-Ask Spreads, 17 J.
ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 55, 56 (1998).
137. Maribeth Coller & Teri Lombardi Yohn, Management Forecasts and Information
Asymmetry: An Examination of Bid-Ask Spreads, 35 J. ACCT. RES. 181 (1997).
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finance for that firm. If those in charge of the firm wish to minimize the
cost of external finance, they will take this fact into account in deciding
whether to commit to a demanding disclosure regime.138 An exchange, for
instance, with a lax disclosure regime might for this reason be unattractive
to a firm if one were willing to assume that those in charge of the firm care
to minimize the cost of external finance. Refusal to make such an
assumption forms the real basis of the case for mandatory disclosure.
Why might higher levels of informed trading result in higher expected
stock returns? Several important papers have recently addressed this
question.139 Consider an uninformed investor who buys an optimally
diversified portfolio. Despite diversifying, this investor will nevertheless do
worse on average than investors with private information, who are better
able to select stocks in constructing their portfolios. Whether the
uninformed investor transacts frequently or not, the investor will likely end
up holding poorly performing stocks relative to the portfolio held by
informed investors.140 A reduction in the amount of private information held
by other traders will reduce this difference in the portfolios held by
informed and uninformed traders, and, as a result, reduce the risk to
uninformed investors that they will end up holding comparatively poorly
performing stocks in their portfolios.
This reasoning implies that the inferior ability of uninformed investors
to pick stocks cannot be diversified away. Consider an uninformed investor
who decides to purchase a diversified portfolio and hold it indefinitely. If
there is private information at the time the investor constructs the portfolio
then he will be more likely to hold stocks that are comparatively poor
performers. Moreover, the decision to hold the same portfolio indefinitely
will levy a real cost if the investor needs to rebalance his portfolio in
response to changes over time in wealth, liquidity needs and risk
preferences. Uninformed but rational investors, knowing of this cost ex
ante, will require a higher rate of return to compensate them for the costs
created by this inflexibility.
One might object that this reasoning relies on the assumption that there
are two categories of investors: those who hold private information and
those who do not. What if the analysis is moved back a step? Suppose it is
unclear ex ante whether any particular investor will acquire private
information at some point in the future? What if all investors know is that in
the future there will be asymmetrical information, but not whether they
138. Cf. Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outside Trading, 101 MICH. L. REV. 313,
337–39 (2002).
139. See David Easley & Maureen O’Hara, Information and the Costs of Capital, 59 J. FIN.
1553 (2004) (modeling the effect of private information on expected stock returns); Nicolae
Gârleanu & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Adverse Selection and the Required Return, 17 REV. FIN. STUD.
643 (2004) (modeling the effect of future private information on expected stock returns).
140. Easley & O’Hara, supra note 139, at 1564–65.
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themselves will be the holders of private information? If this is true then it
might appear that informational asymmetry does not create, on net, costs for
investors. If an investor ends up being a holder of private information then
he will earn more, given his increased ability to buy attractive stocks and
sell unattractive stocks, than those who do not have this information. On the
other hand, if an investor ends up being an uninformed investor then he will
earn less than his informed counterparts by exactly the amount that the
informed investors benefit from their private information. Viewed in this
way, these two effects of informational asymmetry are ex ante a wash and,
as a result, investors will not demand a higher rate of return on stocks that
have higher levels of informational asymmetry.
But this reasoning ignores, as a recent model by Nicolae Garleanu and
Lassa Pedersen illustrates, that in the presence of informational asymmetry,
investors will anticipate that the portfolios they will hold in the future will
differ from what would otherwise be the case in a situation where there was
no informational asymmetry.141 Given the presence of private information,
there will be times when an informed investor will refuse to sell a stock
despite having a liquidity reason to do so. This will occur if the investor has
sufficiently good private news about the stock. At the same time, there will
be times when an informed investor will sell a stock if he has sufficiently
bad private news about the stock, despite having no other reason to alter his
portfolio.142
In other words, the introduction of informed traders changes the
portfolio decisions that investors would otherwise make because of a desire
to take advantage of private information. This represents a cost, albeit a cost
informed investors are willing to bear to take advantage of their
information. While the direct effect on investors of future private
information is zero because the bid-ask spread does not represent a net cost,
there is a change in the portfolio decisions of investors from what would
otherwise be the case. Therefore, it follows that adverse selection increases
costs through its effect on portfolio decisions as portfolio decisions are
distorted as the result of the presence of private information. The costs of
these distortions should be reflected in stock returns.
There is empirical evidence that informational asymmetry does, in fact,
appear to have an important effect on stock returns.143 David Easley, Soeren
Hvidkjaer and Maureen O’Hara employ an empirical measure, developed in

141. See Gârleanu & Pedersen, supra note 139 (modeling the effect of these allocative
inefficiencies on expected stock returns).
142. Id.
143. Another possibility, with mixed empirical support, is that wider bid-ask spreads result in
higher expected returns, given the increase in transaction costs faced by investors. In other words,
the bid-ask spread is treated as if it were an exogenous cost. See Yakov Amihud & Haim
Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. FIN. ECON. 223 (1986).
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a series of earlier papers,144 that measures how much private informationbased trading occurs in a stock (the so-called PIN measure) in order to
investigate the effect of private information on expected stock returns.145
Looking at NYSE-listed stocks for the 1983–1998 period they found
that stocks with higher probabilities of private information-based trading,
controlling for a number of factors, had higher rates of return than
otherwise comparable stocks with lower levels of private information-based
trading.146 Importantly, the probability of private information-based trading
still affected stock returns even after a control for bid-ask spreads was
implemented. Indeed, bid-ask spreads did not have any role in explaining
stock returns in their study.147
While important research, the Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara study does
have some shortcomings that should be kept in mind. First, market beta and
the coefficients on book-to-market and firm size had no statistical
significance in explaining the cost of capital in their study. This is
inconsistent with prior empirical research that has found these factors have
power to explain stock returns.148 Moreover, it is conceptually puzzling that
commonly identified sources of systematic risk, in particular stock market
co-movement, have no measurable effect on stock returns.
Second, the study did not control for the level of public information
concerning firm value. While more private information was associated with
higher expected returns,149 the study did not control for whether this
association still held when controlling for the amount of public information
available. This failure to control for the level of public information is
problematic, given the fact that private and public information, whether
they are substitutes or complements, could very well be correlated. This
calls into some question the results of the study’s regressions.
VI. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE RELATIVE SUCCESS
OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE REGIMES
While there are strong reasons to believe that mandatory disclosure
requirements can be socially and economically beneficial, this obviously
does not mean that the actual implementation and administration of any
particular mandatory disclosure regime will prove to be so. It is not hard to
imagine the various ways in which government regulation of disclosure
could go awry. Regulators will inevitably have imperfect information
144. See David Easley et al., Liquidity, Information, and Infrequently Traded Stocks, 51 J. FIN.
1405 (1996).
145. David Easley, Soeren Hvidkjaer, & Maureen O’Hara, Is Information Risk a Determinant of
Asset Returns?, 57 J. FIN. 2185, 2186 (2002).
146. They controlled for market beta, firm size, book-to-price ratio and bid-ask spreads. Id.
147. Id. at 2208.
148. Dongchelo Kim, A Reexamination of Firm Size, Book to Market, and Earnings Price in the
Cross Section of Expected Stock Returns, 57 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 463, 464 (2002).
149. See Easley et al., supra note 145.
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concerning which pieces of information, if disclosed, will improve the
performance of the capital markets. Moreover, regulators will have
imperfect incentives to seek out the needed information.
An example of a regulatory regime gone astray would be a mandatory
disclosure regime that focuses on requiring irrelevant information to be
released. Indeed, some commentators have argued that this is what the SEC
has done in regulations implementing the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Exchange Act of 1934.150 Even if disclosure requirements mandate the
release of potentially relevant information, firms might subvert the
regulatory regime by meeting the technical requirements of the disclosure
regime while actually avoiding disclosure of specific pieces of information
they would rather keep hidden.151
At the end of the day, it is fair to say that whether any particular
mandatory disclosure regime, as actually instituted and administered, is
socially beneficial is an empirical question. Whatever the benefits, there
might be more-than-offsetting costs. The empirical evidence that directly
attempts to measure the effects of mandated disclosure (some of which has
already been discussed) can help address this question.
A. WHAT TO TEST FOR?
A major weakness in the empirical literature on the effects of
mandatory disclosure has been a lack of a firm theoretical basis for the
testing that has been conducted. Fortunately, recent theoretical research has
begun to provide the necessary theory to provide a solid basis for focusing
on stock returns, volatility and the size of a country’s equity market.
Understanding this theory is crucial as it provides the necessary framework
with which to interpret the empirical findings on mandatory disclosure.
1. Stock Returns
Empirical research on mandatory disclosure has typically measured the
effects of changes in mandatory disclosure on the stock returns of firms
affected by these changes. Measuring these effects has a solid theoretical
basis: If an unexpected improvement in mandatory disclosure requirements
reduces agency costs, such as reducing the diversion of corporate resources,
this should result in positive abnormal returns for the set of companies
affected by the change.152 The lower level of future expected agency costs
will be capitalized into the current stock price to the benefit of current
shareholders.
150. The studies of the effect of SEC disclosures on bid-ask spreads tend to undercut this
argument. See supra notes 134, 137, 138 and accompanying text.
151. See generally HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN
SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 1–60 (1979), for a critique of the effectiveness of the SEC’s disclosure
regime.
152. See Shleifer & Wolfenzon, supra note 46.
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Whether stock returns of firms subject to and affected by more
demanding disclosure requirements, once the benefits of lower agency costs
have been capitalized into the stock price, depends on whether the costs
borne by shareholders on an ongoing basis to minimize agency costs are
reduced by the change in mandatory disclosure. If more demanding
disclosure requirements reduce these costs, such as monitoring and auditing
costs, then risk-adjusted stock returns should be lower.153 This is because
with lower expected costs, shareholders can be induced to hold equity with
a lower expected return. Net of costs, shareholders will do just as well as
before. Conversely, if the costs borne by shareholders are unaffected by a
more demanding disclosure regime, stock returns of affected firms should
not be affected, once the future benefits of reduced agency costs are
capitalized into the stock price.
2. Volatility
Several empirical studies of mandatory disclosure have measured the
volatility of stock returns pre- and post-implementation of mandatory
disclosure. Assuming that the effect of mandatory disclosure, if it is
working, is to cause the earlier release of information by firms, then the
variance-bound finance literature indicates that this should result in lower
stock-return volatility.154 Earlier release of information ensures that the
information has less of an impact on a firm’s stock price assuming a
positive discount rate. In other words, information concerning a more
distant future event is more heavily discounted than information concerning
an event in the immediate future. As a result, information released earlier in
time will have less of an impact on a firm’s stock price.
Unfortunately, there is also literature that suggests high levels of
volatility can be a sign of more informed stock prices. In cross-country
studies, markets with high levels of stock-price synchronicity (defined as
the extent to which stocks tend to move together) tend to be in lessdeveloped, more volatile, markets.155 Moreover, firms with high levels of
firm-specific volatility have stock prices that better predict future earnings
of the company.156 This all suggests that volatility may or may not be a
useful variable in testing the effects of mandatory disclosure on stock
prices.

153. See Lombardo & Pagano, supra note 70.
154. See Kenneth D. West, Dividend Innovations and Stock Price Volatility, 56
ECONOMETRICA 37 (1988); Stephen F. LeRoy & Richard D. Porter, The Present-Value Relation:
Tests Based on Implied Variance Bounds, 49 ECONOMETRICA 555 (1981).
155. See Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung & Wayne Yu, The Information Content of Stock
Markets: Why Do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?, 58 J. FIN.
ECON. 215, 215 (2000).
156. See Artyom Durnev et al., Does Greater Firm-Specific Return Variation Mean More or
Less Informed Stock Pricing?, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 797 (2003).
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3. Size of the Equity Market
A number of studies have examined the effect of legal rules, including
mandatory disclosure requirements, on financial development. One standard
proxy for financial development is the size of a country’s stock market
capitalization held by non-controlling shareholders, scaled by a country’s
GDP. Increases in financial development can, in theory, be caused by legal
rules, including mandatory disclosure requirements, that reduce private
benefits of control, and thereby enable more extensive use of external
finance by firms.
On a cautionary note, however, establishing such a causal link through
correlations between financial development and legal rules is difficult,
given the need to convincingly control for country-specific factors besides
differences in legal regimes across countries. Moreover, reverse causation is
also a plausible possibility, in that financial development may create a
shareholder constituency that demands, and ultimately receives, improved
legal protections.157
B. THE UNITED STATES AS A CASE STUDY
Though the United States has a substantially higher incidence of
dispersed ownership structures than other countries,158 the effect of
mandatory disclosure in the United States is still quite useful in assessing
the possible effects of mandatory disclosure in other countries for several
reasons. First, a nontrivial portion of companies in the United States have
concentrated ownership structures.159 The mean ownership of the three
largest shareholders in the United States is approximately 20%.160
Moreover, the levels of concentrated ownership in the U.S. were substantial
in some earlier markets, such as the over-the-counter market circa 1962.161
Therefore, the United States is not as drastically different from, and as a
result provides a more reasonable point of comparison to, those countries
that have concentrated ownership structures, one might first believe.
Second, mandatory disclosure arguably serves a similar function in the
United States as in countries with concentrated ownership in terms of
controlling agency costs even though there are differences in the nature of
157. See Coffee, supra note 109, at 7–10.
158. This is relevant because the effects of mandatory disclosure in the United States, given the
different dominant ownership structure, might be different than in other countries having
predominantly more concentrated ownership structures. See discussion supra Parts III.A–B.
159. See generally Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, The Role of Majority
Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations: An Exploratory Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 317
(1988); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J.
POL. ECON. 461 (1986).
160. See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 16, at 1146.
161. See SEC & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS,
Chapter VII, at 533 (1963), available at http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/
1960/1963_SS_Sec_Markets/Chapter_ 07_1.pdf.
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the agency problem.162 Finally, many of the studies of mandatory disclosure
have focused on the United States because of the availability of data, which
is high due to the United States’ now fairly long history of mandating
disclosure. Ignoring these studies would be to ignore much of the available
evidence on the effects of mandatory disclosure.
An obvious way to observe the effects (such as on stock returns and
volatility), if any, of mandatory disclosure is to examine any fundamental
changes in the scope of mandatory disclosure in the United States. There
have been two such changes. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange
Act of 1934 represent the first of these fundamental changes. These two
statutes placed extensive mandatory disclosure requirements on exchangelisted firms (Exchange Act of 1934) and firms issuing securities to the
public (Securities Act of 1933). The Securities Act Amendments of 1964
represents the second fundamental change in mandatory disclosure
requirements in the United States.163 The Securities Act Amendments of
1964 extended the mandatory disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act
of 1934 to most non-listed firms (the over-the-counter market).164
In addition to these two fundamental changes, there have been several
other smaller but important changes to mandatory disclosure in the U.S. that
are promising candidates for measuring the effects of mandatory disclosure
requirements. These changes include the requirement imposed by the SEC
in December of 1980 that managers, in the Managerial Discussion and
Analysis section of an annual report, discuss managers’ analysis of the
future prospects of the company.165 A second important change occurred in
1999 when the SEC mandated that the Exchange Act’s disclosure
requirements be extended to firms trading on the OTC Bulletin Board.166
These firms constitute most of the remaining over-the-counter firms not
already subject to mandatory disclosure requirements as a result of the
Securities Act Amendments of 1964.
1. Studies of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of
1934
George Stigler conducted the first empirical study of the effects of
mandatory disclosure.167 His groundbreaking study focused on the
162. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833 (2005) (discussing and reviewing the literature on the agency problem between
managers and widely-dispersed shareholders); Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 17
(providing empirical evidence that entrenched managers harm firm value). The typical agency
problem in the U.S. takes the form of managers not acting in the interests of shareholders.
163. Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 3(c), 78 Stat. 565, 566–68.
164. Id. at 565–569.
165. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2005).
166. Self-Regulatory Organizations, SEC Release No. 34-40606, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,610 (Oct. 27,
1998).
167. George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117 (1964).
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Securities Act of 1933, which regulates the disclosure requirements of new
issues of securities.168 He compared the performance of new issues of
securities pre-mandatory disclosure (1920s) to post-mandatory disclosure
(1950s). The study concluded that there was no meaningful change in the
stock return performance of new issues of securities pre- and post-mandated
disclosure. However, the study did find that the variance of returns of new
issues was substantially lower in the post-mandated disclosure period.169 A
subsequent study confirmed Stigler’s results.170
Based on these results, Stigler concluded that the Securities Act of 1933
was unnecessary.171
However, there are serious questions as to whether Stigler’s results are
very informative about the desirability of the Securities Act of 1933. First,
Stigler’s post-mandatory disclosure time period is several decades after the
change in disclosure. It is unclear why one would expect, at this late period,
stock return performance of new issues to be affected by mandatory
disclosure requirements. The effects of mandatory disclosure, if any, were
presumably capitalized into stock prices years earlier. Second, Stigler used
no control group, beyond the market index, thereby making it almost
impossible for him to control for changing market conditions over this long
period of time.
Carol Simon also examined the Securities Act of 1933.172 Her study
found that the cross-sectional variance of monthly abnormal returns of new
issues in the pre-mandated disclosure period (1926–1933) was larger than
the cross-sectional variance of monthly abnormal returns of new issues in
the post-mandated disclosure period (1934–1939) for non-NYSE,
unseasoned companies.173 Using the cross-sectional variance as a proxy for
investor uncertainty about a firm’s future prospects, she concluded that the
Securities Act of 1933 reduced investor uncertainty for this group of firms.
As with Stigler’s study, however, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions
from these results. Perhaps the most serious problem with the study is the
failure to provide a strong theoretical basis for using the cross-sectional
variance as a proxy for investor uncertainty. Moreover, as with the Stigler
study, there is no control group that was used to control for changing
market conditions over the time period studied.
In perhaps the most influential of all the mandated disclosure studies,
George Benston examined the relative effect of the Exchange Act on two

168. Id.
169. Stigler, supra note 167, at 122.
170. Gregg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New
Security Issues, 24 J.L. & ECON. 613 (1981).
171. Stigler, supra note 167, at 124.
172. Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and the
Performance of New Issues, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 295 (1989).
173. See id. at 313.
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sets of firms.174 This study compared the effects that the imposition of
mandated disclosure had on a set of firms that were not voluntarily
disclosing sales information prior to the Exchange Act, relative to a set of
firms that were already voluntarily disclosing sales information. The set of
voluntarily disclosing firms, in other words, served as Benston’s control
group. Benston found that there was no difference in stock return
performance between the two groups around the period of the enactment of
the Exchange Act. Moreover, while the variance of stock prices for both
groups declined, there was no relative change in the variance of the two
groups.175 Based on these results, Benston—along with a number of legal
academics176—concluded that the Exchange Act was not socially beneficial.
The strength of Benston’s conclusions rests on how convincingly the
study controls for changing market conditions through using the set of
voluntarily disclosing firms as a control group. There are, however, serious
problems with this control group. First, further examination of this group of
voluntarily disclosing firms reveals that many of these firms were not
disclosing a number of pieces of information that the Exchange Act later
required be disclosed.177 Second, the Exchange Act introduced new liability
standards that changed the legal consequences of making misleading
disclosures. This important change introduced by the Exchange Act would
affect both disclosing and non-disclosing firms.178
2. Studies of the 1964 Securities Act Amendments
A fairly recent study by the author looked at the effects of the 1964
Securities Act Amendments’ imposition of mandatory disclosure on the
over-the-counter market.179 Unlike some of the earlier studies, there exists a
natural control group to control for changing market conditions for the time
period studied (1962–1968): the listed companies that had been subject to
mandatory disclosure requirements since 1934. The study used a unique
database that consisted of stock price information three years prior to the
effective date of the 1964 Securities Act Amendments (1962–65) and three
years after these mandatory disclosure requirements were imposed (1965–
68).
The study found that there was a substantial reduction in the volatility
of over-the-counter stocks in the aftermath of the Securities Act
Amendments. In the post-mandatory disclosure period (1965–68), there was
174.
175.
176.
177.

Benston, supra note 1.
See id. at 148–49.
See scholars cited supra note 1.
See generally Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure, supra note 3, at 1373–79
(discussing Benston’s two groups of firms).
178. Id.
179. Allen Ferrell, Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence from the Over-theCounter Market, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 213 (2007).
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no statistically significant difference in the volatility of the over-the-counter
stocks and that of the listed stocks.180 In the pre-mandatory disclosure
period, in contrast, over-the-counter stocks experienced significantly higher
levels of volatility compared to the listed market.181 This can be seen in the
following graph of the yearly average variances of stocks in the over-thecounter market and the listed market. The vertical black line marks the
passage of the Securities Act Amendments. 182
Variance of Monthly Abnormal Returns
200

OTC
Market

180
160

Listed
Market

Variance

140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1962

180. Id. at 21.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 18.

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

2007]

The Case for Mandatory Disclosure

123

In terms of abnormal stock returns, the study found that over-the-counter
stocks experienced a positive abnormal return of approximately 6% in
1963. The year 1963 was chosen because this was the year the market first
learned that the Securities Act Amendments were being considered and
were likely to be enacted. Consistent with this finding, a contemporaneous
study found a positive abnormal return in the over-the-counter market in
1963 in the range of 8%.183
3. Studies of Other Mandated Disclosure Changes in the U.S.
Another study focused on the requirement that managers discuss their
firms’ likely future prospects and found that this improved firms’ shareprice accuracy.184 The study based this conclusion on two findings. First, it
found that in the immediate aftermath of this requirement, the number of
firms with below-average returns temporarily increased.185 This suggested
that poorly performing firms were forced to disclose information that they
would have otherwise attempted to keep hidden as a result of this
requirement. In addition, the study found that the group of firms with
average stock-return performance had lower levels of stock price
synchronicity.186 Using stock-price synchronicity as a proxy for share price
accuracy, this suggests that average performing companies had more
informed stock prices.
A second study examined the effect of the imposition, in 1999, of
mandatory disclosure requirements on OTC Bulletin Board companies.187
These firms are typically much smaller than NASDAQ- or NYSE-listed
firms. OTC Bulletin Board firms that did not wish to comply with the new
mandatory disclosure requirements could elect to be removed from the
OTC Bulletin Board. The study found that firms that were already
complying with the mandatory disclosure requirements experienced
significant positive abnormal stock returns. However, firms that elected to
move (approximately 76% of all firms not already in compliance) and firms
that were not already in compliance but choose not to move experienced
significantly lower returns than the firms already in compliance. These
findings suggest that for a significant number of small, illiquid firms the

183. Greenstone, Oyer & Vissing-Jorgensen, supra note 46. The small difference in the two
abnormal-returns findings is not surprising given the fact that this study used a database consisting
of a somewhat different mix of over-the-counter firms.
184. See Fox et al., supra note 4. This requirement was first imposed in 1980. See Amendments
to Annual Report Form, Related Rules, Regulations, and Guides; Integration of Sec. Acts
Disclosure Systems, SEC Release No. 33-6231, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630 (Sept. 25, 1980) (codified at
17 C.F.R. § 229.303).
185. Fox et al. supra note 4.
186. Id.
187. See Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure
Regulation: Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board, 39 J. ACCT. & ECON. 233 (2005).
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benefits of mandatory disclosure can often be outweighed by the costs that
it imposes.
4. Cross-Country Evidence
Several studies have found that more demanding mandatory disclosure
regimes are correlated with higher levels of financial development.188 This
is consistent with the hypothesis that mandatory disclosure increases the use
of external finance as a result of increasing the ability of controlling
shareholders to credibly commit to return their firms’ profits to investors
rather than diverting them to themselves.
Increases in a country’s mandated disclosure requirements, as measured
by a “disclosure index,” have been found to be associated with an increase
in listed firms per capita (as well as increases in other proxies for financial
development).189 A two-standard deviation increase in a country’s
“disclosure index” was associated with an impressive 52% rise in the
number of listed firms per capita.190
Consistent with these findings, another recent study employing the
same “disclosure index” found that in a dataset consisting of forty countries
over the 1992–2001 period, countries with more demanding disclosure
requirements had significantly lower costs of external finance.191 This effect
on cost of capital was strongest in countries with segmented capital
markets, i.e. countries in which there were impediments to foreign capital
flowing into the country. Mandatory disclosure requirements, however, did
continue to reduce firms’ cost of external finance even in countries
relatively open to international capital flows.
D. EVIDENCE FROM THE STATE COMPETITION LITERATURE
Some commentators have stressed that the beneficial effects of allowing
firms to select their state of incorporation, and thereby their governing
corporate law, provides powerful evidence that mandatory disclosure
requirements should be removed.192 If regulatory competition between the
188. Most of the “law and finance” studies have not focused, however, on mandatory disclosure
requirements, but rather have used indexes, such as the “anti-directors” index, that measure the
strength of a country’s investor rights along other dimensions. See supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
189. See La Porta et al., supra note 31. The “disclosure index” is the average of six disclosure
proxies: requirements that a prospectus be delivered to potential investors; disclosure of insiders’
compensation; disclosure of ownership by large shareholders; disclosure of inside ownership;
disclosure of contracts outside the normal course of business; and disclosure of transactions with
related parties. Id.
190. Id. at 16.
191. See Luzi Hail & Christain Leuz, International Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital:
Do Legal Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter?, 44 J. ACCT. RES. 485 (2006).
192. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 1, at 2383 (“The most important data bearing on the
question whether the federal securities regime should be eliminated is . . . the research on the
impact on shareholder welfare of state competition for charters.”).

2007]

The Case for Mandatory Disclosure

125

states works well in the corporate law area, it should work as well in the
securities field. More specifically, proponents of state competition have
relied heavily on the argument that the empirical evidence indicates that the
corporate law of Delaware, the winner of this competition for
incorporations, improves firm valuation.
Even granting the premise that the evidence on the merits of state
competition in the provision of corporate law is central to evaluating the
desirability of mandatory disclosure, this argument is unconvincing. The
evidence that Delaware improves firm value is actually weak. While there is
one study that claims to find that Delaware incorporation increases firm
valuation,193 subsequent empirical studies have failed to find that Delaware
law consistently improves firm valuation. Two of these subsequent studies
found that Delaware incorporation increased firm value in the early 1990s,
but in the later half of the 1990s the Delaware firm valuation effect was
either nonexistent or negative.194 Another study found no effect of Delaware
incorporation on firm value in the 1990s.195
VII. CONCLUSION
The theoretical case for mandatory disclosure for countries with
concentrated ownership structures is strong. In other words, the case for
mandatory disclosure is strong for virtually all countries around the world.
Controlling shareholders will prefer a lax disclosure regime to serve the
twin goals of protecting their private benefits of control and suppressing
competition in both the market for capital and in the product market.
As for the first goal, protecting private benefits of control, the evidence
clearly demonstrates that controlling shareholders’ private benefits of
control are substantial in many countries. Theory and evidence indicate that
mandatory disclosure can reduce these private benefits of control
substantially. Accordingly, existing controlling shareholders will tend to
have a preference for a lax disclosure regime.
As for the second goal, suppressing competition, there are again strong
theoretical reasons, backed by an impressive body of empirical evidence,
that mandatory disclosure can have the socially desirable effect of
increasing competition between firms for capital and competition in the
product market. Competition for capital will increase because some firms
will find their access to external finance enhanced as a result of being able
to credibly commit to a demanding disclosure regime. Firms that were able
193. See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525
(2001).
194. Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices,
118 Q. J. ECON. 107 (2003); Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004).
195. Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409
(2005).
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to raise capital under a lax disclosure regime will have to compete with
more firms for capital in the presence of a mandatory disclosure regime.
Competition in the product market will increase as potential competitors
have an enhanced ability to raise external finance to fund their operations.
The empirical evidence on the effects of mandatory disclosure on stock
returns, volatility and financial development is consistent with mandatory
disclosure often having socially beneficial effects. In particular, several
recent important empirical studies have provided new evidence pointing to
mandated disclosure playing a socially beneficial role.
Whether countries around the world should adopt or strengthen their
mandatory disclosure requirements is a pressing policy question. The legal
academic debate has largely ignored, however, the merits of mandatory
disclosure regulation for most countries around the world, i.e. countries
with concentrated ownership structures. This article has argued that
mandatory disclosure requirements in securities regulation can play an
important and socially beneficial role for these countries.
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EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY,
OF NEW JERSEY.

PRINCIPAL OFFICE, 83 MONTGOMERY ST., JERSEY CITY, N.J
EXECUTIVE OFFICES, ROCHESTER, N.Y.
REPORT OF THE DIRECTORS
To be presented at the third annual meeting of the shareholders, to be
held at 83 Montgomery St., Jersey City, N. J., on Tuesday, April 5th, 1904,
at twelve o’clock noon.
The Directors submit herewith the audited statement of account for the
year ending the 31st of December, 1903, being the first full year of business
of the company.
In the balance sheet presented the earnings of all the subsidiary
companies are included for the period mentioned.
The balance sheet shows carried to surplus for the twelve months the
amount of $612,023.64 after paying quarterly dividends for the year at the
rate of 6% per annum on its preferred stock and warrants and 10% on its
common stock and warrants, and after charging off liberal amounts for
depreciation on the various plants and $78,404.18 for special reserves.
Attention is again called to the fact that the Company is paying
dividends upon a large amount of capital which has been in but which has
not been invested. The amount uninvested at the close of the period was
about $3,000,000.
The progress of the company during the past year was fully covered by
the directors’ preliminary report which was sent to the shareholders early in
January.
The Directors retiring in conformity with the By-Laws are Messrs.
George Eastman, Sir James Penders and Lord Kelvin. These gentlemen,
being eligible, offer themselves for re-election. A director is also to be
elected to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Mr. Edwin.
The Auditors, Messrs. Price, Waterhouse & Company, also retire and
offer themselves for re-election.
By order of the Board.
W. S. HUBBELL,
Secretary
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EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY
COMBINED BALANCE SHEET, 311
LIABILITIES
CAPITAL STOCK:
Preferred Stock authorized…
of which there has been issued,
Common Stock authorized, ...
of which there has-been issued,
LESS: Calls unpaid ……………………….

$10,000,000
$6,170,368.01
25,000,000
19,356,000.67
$25,526,368.68
705,292.50
$24,821,076.18

CAPITAL STOCK OF SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES
OUTSTANDING ……………………………
CURRENT LIABILITIES:
Accounts Payable, ………………………….
Preferred Stock, Dividends payable January
1st, 1904 ……………………………………
Common Stock, Dividends payable January
1st, 1904 ……………………………………
SURPLUS:
Balance of 31st December, 1902 per Balance
Sheet ………………………………….
Profits of Combined Companies for the year
Ending 31st December 1903.
DEDUCT:
Dividends and Interest,
6% on Preferred Stock………………
10% on Common Stock ……………
On Outstanding Stock of Sub-sidiary
Companies ……………
Special Reserves ………………….
$1,081,022.93
$27,081,022.93

$42,000.00
554,031.28
90,080.07
470,872.56
$1,114,983.91

$468,999.29
2,925,691.16
$3,394,690.45
$368,058.57
1,866,804.77
$2,234,863.34
400.00
$2,235,863.34
____78,404.18
$2,313,667.52
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AND ITS SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES.
31ST DECEMBER, 1903.
ASSETS
COST OF PROPERTY, including Real Estate, Buildings, Plant,
Machinery, Patents and Good Will,
$17,513,685.54
CURRENT ASSETS:
Merchandise, Materials and Supplies, ……………… 2,512,325.17
Accounts and Bills Receivable, ………………………..1,043,996.45
Railway Bonds and other Investments, …………….…...1,753,594.58
Call Loans, ………………………………………………..650,000.00
Cash at Banks and on Hand, ……………………………3,200,269.58
Miscellaneous, ………………………………………….. 285,211.70
$9,545,397.48
$27,059,083.02
We have examined the books of the Eastman Kodak company of New
Jersey, and of Kodak Limited for the year ending December 31, 1903 and
we have been furnished with certified returns from the American and
European Branches, The Kodak Gesellschaft and the Societe Anonymè
Francaise for the same period and we certify that the Balance Sheet at that
date is correctly prepared therefrom.
We have satisfied ourselves that during the year only actual additions
and extensions have been charged to cost of property and that ample
provision has been made for Depreciation.
We are satisfied that the valuations of the Inventories of stocks on hand,
as certified by the responsible officials, have been carefully and accurately,
full provision has been made for Bad and Doubtful Accounts Receivable
and for all ascertainable Liabilities.
We have verified the cash and securities by actual inspection and by
certificates from the depositories, and are of opinion that the stocks and
bonds are fully worth the value at which they are stated in the Balance
Sheet.
And we certify that in our opinion the Balance Sheet is properly drawn
up so as to show the true financial position of the Company and its
Subsidiary Companies, and the Profits thereof for the year ending at that
date.
(Signed) PRICE, WATERHOUSE & Co.
Chartered Accountants
54 William Street,
New York City
28th March, 1904

